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The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing in the Employment Context
Monique C. Lillard*
I. INTRODUCTION
By including an express obligation of good faith in all sales contracts,'
the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) forced the courts around
the nation to recognize and make use of that admittedly amorphous concept
in their analyses of contractual disputes. After the UCC utilized the phrase
"good faith," the Restatement picked it up,2 and good faith has been a factor
in judicial interpretation of nearly all aspects of a contract case: plaintiff s
prima facie case, various affirmative defenses, and all stages of contract
formation, performance and enforcement.'
The phrase has recently become of prime importance to employment
lawyers owing to an abundance of lawsuits alleging that an employee's firing
was in breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This Article
examines what good faith and fair dealing mean in the workplace, particularly
where the relationship between employer and employee is otherwise presumed
to be "at will." The conclusion is that except in sporadic situations, the
concept of good faith and fair dealing is too vague to be helpful to either
party or even to the court. The good faith and fair dealing construct, as
currently understood, should be abandoned in the employment context, as
should the at will presumption. They should be replaced by legislative
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1. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation
of good faith in its performance or enforcement.").
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979) ("every contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement").
3. Robert S. Summers, 'Good Faith' in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968). According to Summers:
Cases have been discovered which, if taken as a whole rather than by states, require
good faith at every stage of the contractual process, from preliminary negotiation
through performance to discharge, and in nearly all kinds of contracts. This is not





prohibition of termination absent good cause. The Model Employment
Termination Act' is an example of such employee protection.
II. HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE PHRASE "GOOD FAITH AND
FAIR DEALING"
Even before the UCC was enacted, a concept which we could now
identify as good faith affected the outcome of contract cases.6 The classic
case of Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon7 is an example when in 1917 Judge Cardozo
interpreted a contract to pay profits resulting from exclusive agency and read
in "a promise to use reasonable efforts to bring profits and revenues into
existence."8 Two years earlier, a California case foreshadowed the UCC's
definition by nearly halfa century: "As understood in law the phrase in 'good
faith' has a settled and well-defined meaning, which generally imports that the
transaction was honestly conceived and consummated.. ."' Good faith
concepts stretch even across millennia. To the Greeks good faith was seen as
5. Approved by the National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws, Aug. 8,
1991. 137 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 513 (Aug. 26, 1991). This Article is not intended as a
propaganda piece on the Model Employment Termination Act. But the author does laud the
concept of a uniform act which will take the matter away from each state's common law.
6. Eric Holmes has written an article probing the historical philosophical definitions of good
faith. See Eric M. Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good-Faith
Disclosure in Contract Formation, 39 U. Prrr. L. REv. 381 (1978):
In an effort to keep the pure theory of contracts pure, courts in the early part of this
century twisted existing legal concepts and rules to accomplish fair results between
contracting parties. Analysis thus was driven underground and the legal profession
was misled by the courts which failed to articulate the real grounds for decisions.
Their fictions led to inequity, uncertainty and unpredictability. Rather than recog-
nizing the lack of good faith as an appropriate invalidating device, courts masked
their decisions in the guise of interpretation and construction, implication, want of
mutuality, particularized rules of offer and acceptance, mutual mistake and lack of
consideration. By using such covert tools, courts concealed the good-faith concept;
but, as Llewellyn warns, such tools are never reliable.
Id. at 388-89 (footnotes omitted).
See also Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith,
and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HAv. L. REy. 401 (1964) (finding that
notions of good faith and fair dealing are threaded though various doctrines in American contract
law).
For another multicultural survey of the concept of good faith, see Ralph A. Newman, The
Renaissance of Good Faith in Contracting in Anglo-American Law, 54 CORNELL L. REy. 553
(1969).
7. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
8. Id. at 215.
9. Heney v. Sturo & Co., 153 P. 972, 974 (Cal. Ct. App. 1915). See also Raymond
Wallenstein, Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial
Contracts: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 20 U. WEST L.A. L. REy. 113, 117-18 (1988-
1989).
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a universal social force, objectively determined. 0 In Canon Law good faith
is a universal moral norm, determined subjectively by each individual's
honesty and conception of duty to God." Under Roman law the good faith
requirement bound the parties not only to the terms actually agreed to, but to
"'all the terms that were naturally implied in their agreement.""' 2 More
recently, Field required "good faith" in his code, 3 and the expression has
been used in statutes with sufficient regularity that E. Allen Farnsworth terms
it "the darling of draftsmen."' 4
Nonetheless, Farnsworth asserts that by the 1950s the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing had been ignored so that "by the time of the promulga-
tion of the Uniform Commercial Code, good faith performance had, in spite
of its ancient lineage, become a poor and neglected relation of good faith
purchase. The Code revived it and used good faith in both senses-good faith
purchase and good faith performance. '
Despite a generation of authority created by the UCC, 6 the definition
of good faith has remained elusive. 7  Farnsworth wrote: "While the
varieties of good faith are not quite as infinite as those of religious faith, it
would be quite extraordinary if this protean concept were used in the same
10. See Holmes, supra note 6, at 402; Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good
Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORI'ELL L. REv. 810, 818 n.35 (1982).
11. Holmes, supra note 6, at 402-03. Another author cites the Old Testament, Leviticus
19:11 as the source of the moral precept of the covenant. Wallenstein, supra note 9, at 131.
12. E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666, 669 (1963) (quoting FREDERICK
LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LooKs AT THE CIvIL LAW 124-25 (1955)).
13. Id. at 667.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 671.
16. Christina Kunz has remarked: "[T]he UCC has, by default, become an active laboratory
of experiments on good faith." Christina Kunz, Frontispiece on Good Faith: A Functional
Approach Within the UCC, 16 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 1105, 1105-06 (1990).
17. Kunz, supra note 16, at 1105-06. See also infra note 21. But see Holmes, supra note
6, at 391 n.38 ("Since only six major articles on 'good faith' in contract law can be found in
the legal literature, it is a much neglected area of study."). Nonetheless, Holmes concluded:
Although the concept [of good faith] is not precise, detailed, or rigid as compared
with others generally used in formulations of contract law, it is suggested that "good
faith" has a sufficiently common core of meaning, over a considerable range of
applications, to make it functional in practical affairs. Properly perceived, "good
faith" is a single mode of analysis comprising a spectrum of related, factual
considerations.
Id. at 450-51.
For an succinct summary of the attempts to define good faith in general, see Russell A.
Eisenberg, Good Faith Under the Uniform Commercial Code-A New Look at an Old Problem,
54 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 5-12 (1971).
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sense in all of these assorted instances."'" Nowhere is this more true than in
the employment context.
From the beginning, the good faith criterion has been criticized for being
so difficult to define that it is unhelpful as a legal standard. 9 Critics worry
that the vagueness of the obligation will lead to uneven enforcement of
sanctions or unequal treatment of parties.20 On the other hand, proponents
of the phrase are not only untroubled by the vagueness of the standard, but
they welcome the potential for judicial flexibility provided by the lack of a
positive definition. They cite equitable discretion, as well as the concepts
of negligence and unjust enrichment, as examples of doctrines which are not
definite, detailed rules, but which function as viable legal standards.2 2 Many
18. Farnsworth, supra note 12, at 668. Farnsworth considered himself fortunate to have
narrowed the UCC's use of the phrase to two meanings, namely a state of mind, as in "good
faith purchase," and a moral description where "the inquiry goes to decency, fairness or
reasonableness in performance or enforcement." Id.
19. Kessler and Fine wrote: 'The law confronts the task, in the interest of certainty, of
identifying and categorizing these amorphous 'residual' concepts [like 'good faith'], only to be
faced with the realization that this process is never-ending." Kessler & Fine, supra note 6, at
449. Despite these words of warning, the author of this Article proceeds with her taskl
20. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, GoodFaith Obligation, 1981 DuKE L.J. 619, 620-21, 647
(noting in particular that the UCC promises predictability and suggesting "that the nebulous scope
of good faith may be clarified by focusing on the availability of an appropriate remedy within
each proffered definition.").
21. Summers wrote:
If an obligation of good faith is to do its job, it must be open-ended rather than
sealed off in a definition. Courts should be left free, under the aegis of a statutory
green light, to deal with any and all significant forms of contractual bad faith,
familiar and unfamiliar. The legislature should grant only power; it should not try
to guide through definitions ....
Summers, supra note 3, at 215.
Similarly, Eisenberg wrote:
It is the concept of the term which must always be stressed and applied, not standar-
dized definitions, refined definitions, analyses of definitions and of terms. Courts
and businessmen can deal with, and handle, concepts and understand them and work
with them, without getting "hung up" on definitions, classifications, and rules with
exceptions which only result in confusion.
Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 17.
Gillette, himself critical of a vague standard, notes others' contentment with case-by-case
enforcement of the obligation. Of the requirement in the German Civil Code, article 242, to
perform obligations "in the manner required by good faith, with regard to commercial usage,"
Gillette wrote:
Notwithstanding the vagueness of the German obligation, unqualified even by a
limitation to honesty in fact, one distinguished commentator noted that German
judges have utilized article 242 as a "roving searchlight" to identify "injustice" in
particular cases "within the limits of their own function and when they had or could
devise workable means to redress it."
Gillette, supra note 20, at 646 (quoting JOHN P. DAwsoN, THE ORACLES OF LAW 261-502
(1968)).
22. Summers, supra note 3, at 265.
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times the implied covenant of good faith serves a "gap-filling function,"23 so
perhaps it is natural that the scope of the covenant should expand and contract
as necessary to fill the holes left by stricter doctrine.
One valiant attempt to give meaning to the phrase came from Robert
Summers, writing in 1968. He suggested that to understand the words "good
faith" one should ask,
What, in the actual or hypothetical situation, does the judge intend to rule
out by his use of this phrase? Once the relevant form of bad faith is thus
identified, the lawyer can, if he wishes, assign a specific meaning to good
faith by formulating an "opposite" for the species of bad faith being ruled
out.24
Summers considered this "excluder" definition to be extremely useful,'
primarily because potential one-word definitions are too limiting or too broad
to reflect how judges use the term.26 For this reason, Summers rejected the
UCC's definition of good faith as unduly narrow. He argued that merchants
understand good faith and fair dealing to be more than "honesty in fact."27
Summers' approach has been criticized. Eric Holmes wrote that
Summers
tacitly denies predictive meaning for the good-faith obligation. His
approach presupposes that the legal phrase "good faith" cannot be com-
prehensively known in the first instance, that judges are to apply intuitively
the good-faith obligation, and that their decisions are to be taken as correct
and will give the correct meaning to this term prospectively. Those who
23. Wallenstein, supra note 9, at 114-15.
24. Summers, supra note 3, at 200; Summers, supra note 10, passim.
25. Summers, supra note 3, passim. See generally Summers, supra note 10. For a related
approach, see Holmes, supranote 6, at 400-01 (explaining the point of view that good faith must
be defined in the negative). According to Holmes, "An analogy to visual perception may shed
light on such categories. If one were to look at a full moon on a dark night, the light perceived
would be known law (the law that could be positively stated), and the surrounding darkness
would be residual categories, negatively perceived." Id.
26. Summers, supra note 3, at 206 ("general definitions of good faith either spiral into the
Charybdis of vacuous generality or collide with the Scylla of restrictive specificity.").
27. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1990) ("'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned."). According to U.C.C. § 1-203 cmt. (1990):
It is to be noted that under the Sales Article definition of good faith (Section 2-103),
contracts made by a merchant have incorporated in them the explicit standard not
only of honesty in fact (Section 1-201) but also of observance by the merchant of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.
See Summers, supranote 3, at 196. One appellate judge in New Jersey states that the definition
is "as soft in the center as the phrase which it attempts to define." Noye v. Hoffmann-La Roche,
Inc., 570 A.2d 12, 18, 5 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 352, 356, 115 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,273
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (Stein, J., concurring), cert. denied, 584 A.2d 218 (N.J. 1990).
Throughout this Article and the Appendix, citations to CCH and BNA reporters have been
included as an aid to the researcher.
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initially inquired about the meaning of "good faith" will say, "I told you
SO."
2 8
Yet Holmes' own attempt to give content to the phrase is scarcely more
predictive.29 Holmes considered that good faith
is a single mode of analysis comprising a spectrum of related, factual
considerations. The context of its use is critically important, [and] the
following factual elements sliould be considered: the nature of the
undisclosed fact, accessibility of knowledge, the nature of the contract, trade
customs 0 and prior course of dealing, conduct of the party in obtaining
knowledge, and the status and relationship of the parties.
31
The fact-dependent nature of this test will lead to case-by-case definitions.
Perhaps this is adequate, and no one should aspire to anything more
specific. As Holmes pointed out, "liberty" and "property" are hard to define,
but people know what they mean and would probably agree with him that they
are not "legal construct[s] but ... basic, straightforward concept[s]. 
2
Russell Eisenberg, for example, rejected attempts to define the phrase,
relying instead on a statement of its purpose and its implication for business:
[t]he purpose of the term "good faith", and the reason why it pervades the
Code, is to constantly remind the business community that it must act in a
just and righteous manner, and that it must transact its business in a moral
manner, within the framework of generally accepted prevailing business
practices, and that it must be aware of what is going on. If a businessman
does not act in that manner, the courts are available to impose its [sic]
judgment upon the litigants and to enforce or to refuse to enforce the
commercial agreements as is just and equitable under the circumstances
presented to the courts.33
But a decade later Clayton Gillette cautioned against too expansive an
interpretation:
[N]otwithstanding a drafting history that partially supports the use of a good
faith obligation to transform altruistic behavior into a legal duty, and
28. Holmes, supra note 6, at 401. See also Gillette, supra note 20, passim.
29. Holmes recognized, "ro the extent [Summers'] approach first seeks contextual meanings
of good faith, it is not antithetical to the ideas proffered in this Article." Holmes, supra note 6,
at 401. His objection was to Summers' '"oot-strap" approach, whereby "the task of the legal
scholar is to cull from the reports a sufficient number of bad-faith opinions, list the specific
forms of bad faith, and then to infer a complementary list of good-faith meanings." Id.
30. In the employment arena the question of business practice is not merely empirical, but
is affected by the ingrained legal presumption of at will employment.
31. Holmes, supra note 6, at 451. For a list of suggested "dos" and "don'ts" required by
the covenant, see Gillette, supra note 20, at 620. He listed rules contemplated by great scholars
on the subject.
32. Holmes, supra note 6, at 451.
33. Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 17-18.
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subsequent scholarly development of that interpretation, courts justifiably
have restricted the scope of the obligation. This conclusion is predicated
on arguments that an expansive obligation extends the responsibilities of
commercial actors beyond bargained-for risk allocations, subjects bargains
to inconsistent and uncertain enforcement, and does not produce offsetting
benefits in commercial conduct.34
Steven Burton named this the "contemplation standard," but continued:
The contemplation standard only directs one to consult the parties'
intentions and reasonable expectations-an amorphous totality of the
circumstances at the time of formation. In contrast, the cost perspective of
contract breach behavior makes it possible to identify with greater
particularity to the relevant expectations and motives that have been held
to constitute bad faith.
... Bad faith performance consists of an exercise of discretion in
performance to recapture opportunities foregone at formation. 5
To sum up, observers of the legal ramifications of the covenant have
differed first in their degree of concern over determining what the covenant
means and second in their understanding of what that meaning is. One scholar
suggested an "excluder" definition; another suggested a factual, case-by-case
totality-of-the-circumstances approach. Another injected a moral element,
while still others recommended staying close to the parties' expectations
regarding their bargain.
III. THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IN THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
Despite the continuing failure of courts or scholars to agree on a
definition of good faith, some courts are willing to impose a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing into the employment contract by operation of law. The
purpose of this Article is to consider the concept of good faith and fair dealing
in the employment context, especially in view of the at will rule. In nearly
all states either the legislature or the judiciary has decreed that employment
contracts which are silent on the matter of termination of the contrac 6 are
subject to a presumption that the parties intended that the contract could be
terminated by either party "at will." This term has been understood to mean
that the contract may be terminated for good reason, bad reason, or no reason
34. Gillette, supra note 20, at 620.
35. Steven Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good
Faith, 94 HARv. L. REv. 369, 387 (1980) (emphasis added). For a further explanation of
Burton's thesis, see Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply
to Professor Summers, 69 IowA L. REv. 497 (1984).
36. If an employment contract is specific as to length or duration of employment, the parties
are usually deemed to have agreed that the employee will be employed for the duration of the
time unless good cause exists for termination. See, e.g., Rosecrans v. Intermountain Soap &
Chemical Co., 605 P.2d 963 (Idaho 1980).
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at all.37 The presumption is triggered by the parties' failure to specify, either
by their words (expressly) or by their behavior (implied-in-fact), how the
relationship will be terminated.
H.G. Wood is given credit for originating the at will presumption in his
now infamous treatise written over 100 years ago.38 Perhaps the presumption
mirrors standard practice (or what was standard practice when the presumption
developed) and is a true reflection of the understanding of the parties to
modem-day employment contracts. 9 Or perhaps it is a fiction designed to
further employer interests.4" Most likely, the truth is in the middle.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that workers know their employer could fire them
for no reason or an arbitrary reason, but "I know that he won't." At any rate,
the presumption allows the courts to impose contractual terms beyond those
agreed to by the parties.
Similarly by implying "in law" a covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
the courts are also imposing contractual terms to which the parties did not
actually consent. This Article addresses how the law can and whether the law
should impose both the at will presumption and the good faith/fair dealing
covenant into the same contract.
One understanding of the covenant allows both the presumption and the
covenant to co-exist harmoniously. Steven Burton suggested that the covenant
may merely require that each side "effectuate the intentions of parties, to
37. The Tennessee Supreme Court wrote that an at will contract allowed termination "for
good cause, for no cause, and even for cause normally wrong." Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R.,
81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
38. H.G. WOOD, LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877). Nearly every state's
seminal employment decision has a section devoted to the history of at will employment.
Wood's apparent creation of the at will presumption is extraordinary in view of the far more
worker-friendly statutes of ancient England. E.g., Statute of Labourers, 1562, 5 Eliz., ch. 4
(Eng.) (providing that an employee could not be discharged "unless it be for some reasonable
and sufficient cause or matter."). Wood's scholarship has been debunked, yet his proclamations
continue to affect all workers and managers in private enterprise in the United States. See, e.g.,
Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 479 A.2d 781, 784, 101 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,485, 117
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2163 (Conn. 1984); Wagensellerv. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025,
I Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 526, 103 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,511, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3166
(Ariz. 1985); Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule Revisited, 22
ARiz. ST. L.J. 551 (1991). Certainly some modem day justification for the rule exists. See also
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984)
(defending freedom of contract as an aspect of individual liberty and challenging the assumption
that employees are unable to protect themselves in day-to-day transactions). According to
Epstein, "With employment contracts we are not dealing with the widow who has sold her
inheritance for a song to a man with a thin mustache." Id. at 954.
39. Of course as the law is disseminated, it creates expectations; legal fiction can become
fact.
40. While the presumption provides reciprocal rights so that the worker as well as the
employer may terminate at will, this seeming symmetry is more theoretical than practical. Most
of the time the worker is in a weaker economic position than the employer and will be more
seriously hurt when the employer exercises at will rights than the employer will be hurt when
the tables are turned.
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protect their reasonable expectations."41 In the at will context, the presump-
tion decrees that the worker expects that he can be terminated for any bad,
arbitrary reason. When the worker is then fired for some bad, arbitrary
reason, that is in conformity with his expectations and is in line with the
covenant. "Good faith" then adds nothing to this worker's rights.
Most proponents of the covenant suppose that it imposes something more
on the parties than this. Yet while the motivations and goals of these
proponents are laudable,4 their logic is flawed if at the same time they cling
to the idea that the at will presumption remains intact.43 The two concepts
are incompatible.
This last proposition may seem obvious, yet many jurists persist in
arguing for imposition of a meaningful covenant while at the same time
blithely asserting that imposition of the covenant will not alter the at will rule
in the jurisdiction." Nearly all courts providing relief to employees begin
their opinions by asserting that the at will doctrine remains viable." Is such
adherence to expressions of the past merely evidence that even the most liberal
courts are unwilling to admit that they are changing the law? Or does it
bespeak that if newspaper headlines yell that "at will" has been abolished,
business investment in the state will dry up? Or is it an attempt to narrow the
decision, to heighten the burden of proof or to establish that these situations
41. Burton, supra note 35, at 371. See also supra notes 76-93 and accompanying text.
42. One such proponent has written:
Employment contracts are the most sensitive of all contracts. They determine the
standard of living and the quality of education for children, and affect the general
welfare of all the people in this country. It is ludicrous that the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing has been adopted pertaining to commercial transactions but has
not been adopted for transactions involving human working conditions.
Morriss v. Coleman, Inc., 738 P.2d 841, 851-52, 2 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 844, 107 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) 55,825 (Kan. 1987) (Herd, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
43. Gillette made a similar point in a different context, for he ended his piece by saying:
"The point of the article is not the wrongheadedness of attempts to conform commercial conduct
to ethical or economic objectives. Rather, the intent is to raise questions about using notions of
good faith for that purpose." Gillette, supra note 20, at 661.
44. Consider the following misunderstanding of the at will presumption:
The public policy torts in general and the tort of retaliatory discharge in particular
cannot be seen as erosions of the so-called at will doctrine. An employer still has
in the typical at-will employment situation the absolute right to dismiss an employee
at-will or at whim; the employer just cannot do so for reasons which offend public
policy, such as the rightful filing of an industrial insurance claim.
K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1369, 2 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 56,106 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) 55,683 (Nev. 1987). For a dubious attempt to reconcile good faith and at will,
see infra text accompanying Appendix note 172.
45. The BNA Manual on Individual Employment Rights begins nearly every state's
summary with a reaffirmation of the at will doctrine. For other examples, compare the dictum
and the holdings in Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 2 Ind. Emp. Rights
Cas. (BNA) 739 (Ala. 1987); Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 4 Ind. Emp.
Rights Cas. (BNA) 961, 113 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,136 (Idaho 1989).
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are rare nd must be proven as exceptions? Whatever the reasons, such a
position is untenable.
On the other hand, the courts that do admit an intention to erode the at
will rule would do better to find a more direct means of doing so, rather than
relying on the covenant. This Article will explain some preliminary concepts,
examine the law of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in all fifty
states, and conclude that so much ambiguity exists as to just what the covenant
means and how much it can accomplish that the covenant should be
abandoned.
The covenant does not provide adequate protection to most workers,"
yet succeeds in muddying the waters sufficiently that employers are hesitant
to take decisive action and fear wild-card lawsuits. This is the worst of all
possible worlds.47 The covenant proves a useless vehicle in preventing
unfairness in the workplace and should be eschewed for more direct and less
ambiguous legislation to protect workers.
Lawmakers48 should abandon the at will presumption and impose an
obligation on most employers to terminate only for good cause. In jurisdic-
tions where the at will presumption is statutory, the separation of powers
doctrine requires this change to come from the legislature. This is the type
of macro-level decision best suited to legislative action. However, in
jurisdictions where both at will and good faith are creatures of the common
law, it is entirely within the province of the state's highest bench to modify
the common law.49
46. The most popular definition of the covenant-the benefit of the bargain rule-is
relatively clear cut but it provides additional protection to only a handful of employees, For an
explanation of the benefit of the bargain rule, see infra part VII.
47. Cynical readers may not agree with this assertion. An argument can be made that
uncertainty in the law keeps people on their toes, especially if the stakes are high, as they were
when verdicts for tortious breach of the covenant were estimated to average between $300,000
and $700,000. Compare 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) § 540 at 23 with Ralph King, Jr., Fair-To
Whom?, FORBES, Nov. 28, 1988, at 124. The argument is that it is better for workers if
employers are scared of lawsuits and hence bend over backwards to be fair. This is in line with
the practice of many large law firms not to set a minimum yearly total of billable hours for their
associates. Each paranoid associate then tries to top the next in billables, and the resultant
escalation inures to the benefit of the firm.
48. The fairest result for workers across the nation would be a national law. There is a risk
that if state lawmakers begin to act in this area they will also begin to vie with other states which
are desperate for economic growth. A bidding war could result, with workers' rights being
traded away for potential economic development. However, the common law nature of wrongful
discharge actions makes it unlikely that a national solution will seriously be considered.
49. The North Carolina Supreme Court correctly wrote:
[As] this Court, notthe legislature, adopted the employee-at-will doctrine in the first
instance, it is entirely appropriate for this Court to further interpret the rule. Further,
it is important to note that this Court is applying the doctrine in the light of the
established public policy and not changing public policy to suit the rule.
Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445, 448 n.3, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 987, 113
Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,135 (N.C. 1989).
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IV. THE CONTRACTUAL NATURE OF THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
In even the most casual employment situations, a contract is formed. It
is either a bilateral contract, whereby one party promises to work and the
other to pay, or a continuing unilateral contract, whereby if one party works,
the other promises to pay. The contract may be express or may be implied
in fact by conduct. However formed, if a deal has been accepted whereby one
person works for another for remuneration, the parties have what can be called
the basic employment contract.
Where parties run into difficulty is in establishing the terms of the
contract. When the parties have not been sufficiently specific,"° the court
will have to fill in the gaps, or, in effect, specify the terms of the contract.
To do so, the court considers provisions that are implied in law or in fact.
The court first looks at what the parties actually said. The court then
interprets the words used by the parties, often by taking other facts (e.g.,
industry practice) into account. Depending on the extent to which the court
considers facts beyond the words used by the parties, the court's activity is
called interpretation of an express contract or enunciation of implied-in-fact
contractual provisions.
Recently in employment law, courts have expanded the range of outside
facts that they will consider. Employment manuals, personnel policies, past
employer practices and industry practices have supplied the facts from which
courts were willing to create implied-in-fact contractual provisions.
These scenarios are ambiguously referred to by some courts and many
lawyers as "situations where a contract exists." This language is confusing.
The existence of basic contract is always crucial to the creation of the
employment relationship. What these people mean is that an express or
implied-in-fact contractual provision regarding termination exists. Sloppy
language further obscures the issues in an already murky area of the law.2
To repeat, one method used by the courts to fill in the gaps in the basic
employment contract is to scrutinize the facts surrounding the contractual
dealing to imply in fact certain provisions. The other gap-filling method looks
50. Sometimes the parties have failed to discuss a matter. Other times they have not fully
discussed a matter or have been imprecise in their discussion. Nonetheless, because of certain
facts, or by operation oflaw, the court will conclude that the parties intended to make a certain
deal.
51. For an example of a confusing misstatement, see Noye v. Hoffinann-La Roche, Inc., 570
A.2d 12, 14, 5 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 352, 115 Lab. Cas. (CCI) 56,273 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div.) ("a tort for wrongful discharge has been recognized, even in the absence of any
contract.. . ."), cert. denied, 584 A.2d 218 (N.J. 1990).
52. A further source of confusion is the many definitions and uses of the word "term." A
contractual provision is referred to as a "contractual term." The specified duration of the contract
is referred to as the "term of the contract." Colloquial usage of "term" as a verb renders the
phrase "termed to be" synonymous with "said to be" or "inferred to be." Add to this that the
primary issue at hand is the termination of the contract, and one can wind up with sentences like:




to the law itself. Both the at will presumption and the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing fall into the second category. They allow the court to tell the
parties that they "agreed" to certain provisions, whether they knew it or not.
The difference between at will and the covenant is that at will is a presump-
tion for interpretational purposes which can be overcome by any express or
implied-in-fact agreement to the contrary. On the other hand, the covenant is
deemed present in all contracts. 3 In other words, the at will presumption
arises only in the face of the parties' silence, whereas the covenant is an
additional clause in all contractual obligations.
If both the presumption and the covenant are read into the same contract,
the contractual provisions regarding termination are as follows: employer may
terminate this contract for whatever reason-good, bad, unfair, arbitrary,
capricious, downright mean-but will do so in good faith. 4
Many state courts avoid the internal inconsistency of this by exempting
employment contracts from the covenant. This certainly solves the problem,
but oftentimes judicial failure to be forthright muddles the issue. Some courts
quote the Restatement rule that the covenant exists in every contract, then
assert that it does not apply to employment contracts, but never explain the
seeming contradiction, nor even admit that they are making an exception to
the Restatement rule." These jurisdictions are doing one of two things:
either they are excepting employment contracts from general contract law, or
they are suggesting that the covenant applies to the employment contract but
has little or no meaning, so as to be a nullity. The difference between these
two possibilities is academic, since the result is the same-no cause of action
lies. But the approach more in keeping with precedent and logic is the latter.
The covenant lies dormant in all contracts, and it must be filled up with
definitional content in order to affect either interpretation or determination of
breach.
Some courts expressly state that the implied covenant cannot run counter
to either express or statutorily implied contract terms, for example the at will
presumption. These courts then refuse to impose the obligations of the
covenant on the parties. Such opinions are at least internally consistent.
5 6
53. The possibility of contracting out of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing is not
the direct subject of this Article.
54. The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., 381
S.E.2d 445, 448, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 987, 113 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,135 (N.C.
1989), makes a nearly identical proclamation, except that the North Carolina court's understand-
ing of at will is more restricted. Prohibition on bad faith discharge in that state goes back to
1874. See Haskins v. Royster, 70 N.C. 601 (1874).
55. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Rochelle Coal Co., 813 P.2d 1308,6 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA)
1057, 122 Lab. Cas. (CCII) 56,962 (Wyo. 1991). For courts which are clearer in explaining
their thought processes, see Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 849-51, 2 Ind. Emp. Rights
Cas. (BNA) 844, 107 Lab. Cas. (CCII) 55,825 (Kan. 1987); Sheets v. Knight, 779 P.2d 1000,
1007-08, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1196, 115 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,267 (Or. 1989).
56. See, e.g., Sheets, 729 P.2d at 1008.
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V. THE ROLE OF THE COVENANT IN CREATING RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS IN THE WORKPLACE
Using the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to interpret express or
implied-in-fact contractual obligations is hardly controversial. For instance,
many courts, when presented with breach of a satisfaction contract, allow good
faith concepts to help define what the parties meant by using the word
"satisfaction" when they formed the contract." More unusual are courts
which use the covenant as the source of a private right of action. Of those
which do allow a cause of action on the covenant, some limit these suits to
situations where some express or implied-in-fact provisions exist other than
the basic employment contract. More interesting are the jurisdictions which
allow the covenant to be the source of a separate cause of action in all
employment relationships, including those relationships which have been
designated at will by the operation of the presumption.
Suits brought by otherwise at will employees for breach of the covenant
currently sound only in contract." Assuming the action sounds in contract,
the remedies are still not clear: what is the measure of the expectation loss?
To appreciate the question of how to measure damages in a suit brought
by an otherwise at will employee for breach of the covenant, consider the
following classic example of an employer who does not act fairly. An
employer and a salesperson have a contract spelling out the method of
payment of commissions, but not articulating the circumstances under which
the employment relationship may be terminated. The at will presumption then
goes into operation. The employer fires the salesman but articulates no
reason, and the firing is timed so that the salesman does not receive full
commissions on a sale he worked on extensively. There is no technical breach
of express contract.59 If the facts permit, the salesman may be able to point
to the employer's past practices or to oral statements in order to imply in fact
a contractual term to fire only for cause or only after certain procedures are
followed.6" If such facts do not exist, the salesman loses in most jurisdic-
57. See, e.g., Kramer v. Philadelphia Leather Goods Corp., 73 A.2d 385, 386-87 (Pa. 1950).
58. Nevada has allowed tort recovery for breach of the covenant when a contractual
limitation on the employer's right to terminate exists and malice is found. An employee working
under such a contract is not at will. K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370, 2 Ind.
Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 56, 106 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,683 (Nev. 1987). Much has been
written about whether breach of the covenant in the employment context should be enforced in
tort or in contract; that question will not be discussed in this Article.
59. This classic situation is a modified version of the facts in Fortune v. National Cash
Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4658 (Mass. 1977). In order to make our
collective moral sense of fairness congruent with the law, the Massachusetts high court used the
covenant to fill in the gap in contract law. Id. at 1255-56. The jury verdict in favor of the
plaintiff salesman was upheld. Id. at 1259. See infra text accompanying Appendix notes 134-43.
60. Some jurisdictions speak of implying in fact a covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
See, e.g., Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371, 378, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights
Cas. (BNA) 1092 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). This mixture of legalisms is not a true description of
what these courts are doing. They are scrutinizing the facts, most often past practices and
industry custom, and implying in fact a contractual provision to treat employees in a certain
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tions. In the few jurisdictions allowing a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to be implied in law, the employer may not act to destroy the benefit
the salesperson had a right to expect because of the express commissions
contract. Absent the covenant, the salesman is out of luck, even though nearly
everyone" would consider the employer's actions unfair. Rather than allow
such a result, the courts avail themselves of the covenant. But the remedies
question remains: Is the salesperson entitled to her or his job back, to back
and front pay62 for the expected continued employment, or merely to the
dollar amount of the unpaid commissions?63
specific way.
61. Firm believers in freedom of contract would point out that both parties knew or should
have known what they were getting into, that the salesperson should have read the contract,
realized that he was not protected against an at will firing, and used his bargaining position to
renegotiate the contract. If his bargaining position was not good enough to get him a better deal
from his boss, so be it: the market has spoken.
This position is logically sound, and for those people who consider a purely rational world
to be the ideal world, this position may have normative value. Perhaps it would be best if
everyone thought through every ramification of every aspect of every agreement, although at
some point all of this worrying might itself become inefficient. But to the extent that freedom
of contract proponents seriously contend that they have explained how the world works, they fail
to take into account human nature, see inffra text accompanying note 84, and the realities of the
workplace. There will nearly always be more applicants for sales jobs than there will be jobs,
so seldom will a worker be able to renegotiate the contractual terms with the boss. And rarely
will the worker have the luxury of being choosy.
62. Back pay is wages and benefits that would have been earned but for the wrongful
discharge. Front pay is prospective lost wages granted in lieu of reinstatement.
63. See Wakefield v. Northern Telecom Inc., 769 F.2d 109, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA)
1762, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2080 (2d Cir. 1985).
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VI. "PUBLIC POLICY" AND OTHER STATE TORTS
In many jurisdictions a tort cause of action is allowed when an employee
has been discharged in violation of a substantial public policy.' Some
states 5 have recognized that the questions of whether the employer has acted
in good faith, or fairly, are essentially questions of public policy.66 In those
jurisdictions, breach of the covenant is a subset of public policy cases.67
64. In a few states, a cause of action for discharge in violation of public policy sounds in
contract. Alaska: Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights
Cas. (BNA) 129, 116 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,337 (Alaska 1989); Arco Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753
P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1988); Walt v. State, 751 P.2d 1345, 3 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 808,
122 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 57,045 (Alaska 1988); Thomas P. Owens, Employment at Will in Alaska:
The Question of Public Policy Torts, 6 ALAsKA L. REv. 269 (1989); Massachusetts: Norris v.
Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1030, 113 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) 56,108 (1st Cir. 1989); Stepanischen v. Merchants Dispatch Transp. Corp., 722
F.2d 922, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 309, 99 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,609, 114 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 3641 (1st Cir. 1983); Mello v. Stop & Shop Cos., 524 N.E.2d 105, 3 Ind. Emp. Rights
Cas. (BNA) 1105, 122 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,932 (Mass. 1988); Hobson v. McLean Hosp. Corp.,
522 N.E.2d 975, 3 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1217 (Mass. 1988); DeRose v. Putnam Mgt.,
496 N.E.2d 428, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1672, 105 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,659 (Mass.
1986); Michigan: Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 109 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
55,888, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4708 (Mich. 1980); Lopus v. L & L Shop-Rite, Inc., 430
N.W.2d 757, 3 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1690, 119 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,645 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1988). The Michigan cases must be viewed in light of the following additional authorities
indicating a split among the different panels of the Michigan Court of Appeals as to whether a
retaliatory discharge claim sounds in tort or contract: Pratt v. Brown Mach. Co., 855 F.2d 1225,
3 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1121, 111 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,025 (6th Cir. 1988) (tort);
Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 250,
99 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,412, 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2596 (6th Cir. 1983) (tort); Mourad v.
Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395, 6 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 193, 121 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) 56,861 (Mich. Ct. App.) (contract), appeal denied, 478 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. 1991);
Lopus v. L & L Shop-Rite, Inc., 430 N.W.2d 757, 3 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1690, 119
Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,645 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (contract); Watassek v. Michigan Dep't of
Mental Health, 372 N.W.2d 617 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (contract); Goins v. Ford Motor Co., 347
N.W.2d 184, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3231 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (tort). New Hampshire: Monge
v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4755 (N.H. 1974); South Dakota:
Johnson v. Kreiser's, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225, 3 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1767 (S.D. 1988);
Wisconsin: Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 98 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,398,
115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4484 (Wis. 1983).
65. Fleming v. Pima County, 685 P.2d 1301, 1306, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2338 (Ariz. 1984).
66. Indeed this is the argument for why breach of the covenant should sound in tort. See
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 3 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1729, 110 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) 55,978 (Cal. 1988). Several states do a flip on this argument and hold that the
public policy cause of action sounds in contract. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743
S.W.2d 380, 385-86, 3 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1060 (Ark. 1988); Mello, 524 N.E.2d at
105-08.
67. E.g., Salazar v. Furr's, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1403, 1410, 2 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA)
696, 12 L.R.R.M (BNA) 2605 (D.N.M. 1986); Vandegrift v. American Brands Corp., 572 F.
Supp. 496, 498, 115 L.RR.M. (BNA) 2317 (D.N.H. 1983); Glaz v. Ralston Purina Co., 509
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Any approach which recognizes that breach of the covenant is essentially
a breach of social norms, as opposed to an actual contractual term, goes a long
way toward avoiding legal fictions and reducing arbitrary results. 8 Currently
most states' law on public policy cases is that the source of the public policy
must be grounded in statute. But a narrow reading of this rule and selectivity
as to statute leads to capricious results. Someone fired for filing a workers'
compensation claim can bring a public policy claim and recover tort damages
in many states. Someone fired because his wife incurred substantial medical
expenses that the employer was required to pay pursuant to a hospitalization
plan69 might at best be able to file an action on the covenant and recover
contract damages in a few states. The employee goes uncompensated in most.
The difference? State statutes establish that workers have a right to workers'
compensation, but nothing establishes a right to dependent health care. The
second firing is not prohibited by a constitution, a statute or a regulation and
fairness is not recognized as a substantial policy goal. Of course, if courts did
adopt a broad understanding of public policy to encompass fairness, it would
become as nebulous as good faith and fair dealing. This Article would still
ask: What do those words mean? How are employers to act toward their
employees?
Various other state torts address behavior which could also be termed
"bad faith" or even "breach of the covenant." These include the torts of
outrage, intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud.7" Also the
"malice, opprobrium" formulations necessaryto prove punitive damages cover
many bad faith acts.7' Because this Article is intended as a critique of the
use of the covenant, it is confined to court opinions on the covenant rather
than on other common law actions.
N.E.2d 297, 299, 2 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 497 (Mass. Ct. App. 1987) (citing DeRose v.
Putnam Mgt. Co., 496 N.E.2d 428, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1672, 105 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
55,659 (Mass. 1986)) (sounding in contract).
68. Some courts have made the point that "the public policy approach is largely
encompassed within the covenant." Knight v. America Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788, 792,
104 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,566 (Alaska 1986).
69. See Miller v. Correction Corp. of Am., 119 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,692 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1991) (disallowing public policy/retaliatory discharge claim because conduct which does not
violate any constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision is not "against the public policy of
the state."). The example assumes that the wife's condition did not arise to the status of a
disability as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
70. Somejurisdictions are quite creative. See, e.g., McWilliamsv. AT & T Info. Sys., Inc.,
728 F. Supp. 1186, 5 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 295 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (Pennsylvania's tort
of "discharge intended specifically to cause harm," but note that the existence of this tort has
been called into question); see also Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 2 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas,
(BNA), 104 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,569, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3449 (Mo. 1985) ("prima facie
tort" discussed but rejected in Missouri).
71. In fact, E. Allan Farnsworth suggests that the creation of bad faith torts is a back door
means of allowing punitive damages in contract: "What better way for courts to justify an award
of punitive damages than to invent a new tort: 'bad faith for breach of contract."' E. Allan
Farnsworth, Developments in ContractLaw During the 1980's: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 203, 204 (1990).
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VII. ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE THE COVENANT IN THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
Before rejecting the covenant as a means to protect employees while
providing some guidelines for employers, it is necessary to examine what
content the state courts have given to the phrase "good faith and fair dealing."
Certainly the common law is replete with phrases and concepts which are hard
to define in the abstract, but about which a consensus of denotative convention
has been reached. "Good faith and fair dealing" could have become such a
phrase, but it has not. Jurists, whether friendly or hostile to the imposition of
the covenant in the workplace, have wildly disparate conceptions of the rights
and obligations implied by the words "good faith and fair dealing."'72 These
conceptions fall generally into the following categories:
1. Too vague to discuss. Many state courts make use of the phrase
"covenant of good faith and fair dealing" only for the purpose of rejecting the
concept as a basis for a private cause of action in the employment context.
These courts usually do not take the trouble to define the phrase, although
they must have had some notion of what they were rejecting. The very
difficulty of definition is what leads many courts to decline to make use of the
concept.73
2. I know it when I see it. When state courts do venture to define the
phrase, many define merely by giving examples of either good faith or bad
faith behavior. Standard scenarios involve the commissions salesperson74 and
the person who is fired just before his or her pension vests.75
3. Benefit of the bargain. Currently the most popular definition focuses
on protection of the benefit of the employee's bargain.76 This is the
72. The law relating to the covenant is redesigned by nearly every case applying or rejecting
the use of the covenant. Perritt has gathered covenant cases and grouped them according to
methods that courts have used to limit the doctrine of the covenant. The covenant can be
restricted by limiting actionable situations to those where "an employer failed to follow employer
promulgated procedures," where service was long-term, longevity, "where an employee was
deprived of compensation for past service," and where public policy is violated. Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Implied Covenant: Anachronism or Augur, 20 SroN HALL L. REV. 683 passim
(1990). For further discussion ofwhat the covenant means in the employment context, see James
R. Madison, The Employee's Emerging Right to Sue for Arbitrary or Unfair Discharge, 6
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 422 (1980-1981).
73. See, e.g., Parnar v. Americana Hotels Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4817
(Haw. 1982).
74. See Wakefield v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 769 F.2d 109, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA)
1762, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2080 (2d Cir. 1985); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364
N.E.2d 1251, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4658 (Mass. 1977); supra note 59 and accompanying text;
infra text accompanying Appendix notes 134-43.
75. Pennsylvania seems to have had a run of such situations. See, e.g., Foley v.
Presbyterian Ministers' Fund, 749 F. Supp. 109, 5 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1551 (E.D. Pa.
1990); Mudd v. Hoffman Homes for Youth, 543 A.2d 1092 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
76. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas.
(BNA) 526, 103 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,511, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3166 (Ariz. 1985). Courts
in other states have followed Wagenseller. See, e.g., ARCO, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 3
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narrowest possible definition, applicable to very few cases, and is the least
intrusive into management discretion." The Arizona Supreme Court in
Wagenseller is often cited for holding:
[T]he implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing protects the
right of the parties to an agreement to receive the benefits of the agreement
that they have entered into. The denial of a party's right to those benefits,
whatever they are, will breach the duty of good faith implicit in the
contract... The covenant does protect an employee from a discharge
based on an employer's desire to avoid the payment of benefits already
earned by the employee.78
At least one scholar, Deborah Schmedmann, endorsed this rule as being
the farthest the courts can legitimately go in an at will world, especially if the
at-will presumption is created by the legislature.79 She pointed out that the
origins of this approach can be found in the Restatement definition of good
faith as "faithfulness to an agreed upon common purpose and consistency with
the justified expectations of the other party."8 The covenant is violated if
the employer deprives the employee either of the clear monetary benefits of
the bargain or of procedural safeguards (e.g. promises regarding bases for
termination, systems for evaluation and discipline).8 ' Schmedmann realized
that insofar as courts allow promises to create contract liability, the action
could be based on implied-in-fact contract as well as on the covenant, but she
suggested that the more flexible covenant could withstand technical contract
defenses better than a claim for breach of implied-in-fact contract.8 2
The benefit-of-the-bargain approach is moderate, protecting employees
to some degree yet also preserving management prerogative. The parties
remain free to avoid bargains they do not want, but cannot weasel out of their
obligations once the deal is struck. This rule prohibits terminations which "are
troublesome because they are antithetical to the bargain.1
83
Proponents of this definition do not acknowledge that human nature may
render the benefit-of-the-bargainrule ineffective as a means of protecting most
Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 808, 122 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 57,045 (Alaska 1988); Foley v,
Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 3 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1729, 110 Lab. Cas,
(CCH) 55,978 (Cal. 1988); Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 4 Ind. Emp.
Rights Cas. (BNA) 961, 113 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,136 (Idaho 1989).
77. E. Allan Farnsworth considers that Wagenseller and Foley refused "to extend the
doctrine of bad faith breach to the employer-employee relationship." Farnsworth, supra note 71,
at 206. He apparently considers the protection offered by these cases so minimal that it does not
meaningfully affect the at will rule.
78. Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1030-41. See also Foley, 765 P.2d at 401 n.41; Metcalf, 778
P.2d at 749.
79. Deborah A. Schmedmann, WorkingBackwards: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing in Employment Law, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1119 (1990).
80. Id. at 1135 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1979)).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1136-37.
83. Id. at 1137.
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employees. People are not clear on their bargains, particularly at the
beginning of their dealings with each other. This is. especially true in the-
employment context. If people are really thinking about the bargain they are
getting into-and this usually occurs when a great deal of money is in-
volved-they hire lawyers and reduce the bargain to writing. Most prospec-
tive employees do not behave in so calculated a fashion. They are uneasy if
not desperate when seeking a job. If they can get a foot in the door at a
company, they sign on, "giving it a try." Gradually, they work their way up,
paying attention to the rest of their lives, but building up subliminal
expectations about job security, about "how things are done around here." If
they are then fired in a certain way, or for a certain reason (or lack thereof),
they feel that "it isn't fair," or "that's not what I expected." 4
Most of the cases covered by the benefit-of-the-bargain rule are also
covered by another doctrine. For example, the commission salesman should
be able to sue in some form of restitution or quantum meruit" His recovery
may well be the same,86 and the jurisdiction would not be burdened by
additional lawsuits which arise whenever a new cause of action is created.
But the benefit-of- the-bargain rule does provide some protection for workers
who are treated in a way that most Americans find offensive.
One of the best examples of such a case arose in Idaho.87 Armida
Metcalf worked subject to a policy by which "an employee could accrue sick
leave at a rate of one day per month."88 She got sick and used some but not
all of her accrued sick leave. Her absences exceeded the company average for
that time and caused "serious work problems for that office," so the company
changed her status from full to part time. Traditional contract rules would not
allow Metcalf to sue to get either her full job back or monetary damages for
it. The contract allowed her paid sick leave, and she was properly paid for the
days off. To recover for her termination she needed to argue one or both of
the following legal theories: contract (implied-in-fact) not to terminate for
using the accumulated sick leave or covenant (implied-in-law into the contract)
which prohibited her firing.
The Idaho Supreme Court remanded the question of implied-in-fact
contract, asking the trial court to determine if "by providing for accumulated
sick leave benefits, the employer impliedly agreed with the employee that the
employment relationship would not be terminated or the employee penalized
84. In fact, in many of the wrongful termination cases, management has changed, so that
the "old man" who first hired the worker has left and the terms of the deal have changed, and
few people are around to recollect what the expectations were. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies,
Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 919-20, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4002 (Ct. App. 1981).
85. See, e.g., Schackleton v. Federal Signal Corp., 554 N.E.2d 244 (ill. 1989).
86. This assumes that recovery for breach of the covenant sounds only in contract. Much
of the initial appeal of the covenant was the potential for tort damages. Again, this tort vs.
contract debate is beyond the scope of this Article.
87. Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 961,
113 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,136 (Idaho 1989).




for using the sick leave benefits which the employee had accrued." 9 As to
the covenant, the court agreed that the employee had stated a cause of action:
"[A]ny action which violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit or
right which either party has in the employment contract, whether express or
implied, is a violation of the covenant which we adopt today."9
Even in the Metcalf case, however, a plaintiff's stronger case rests on
implied-in-fact contract. The benefit of the bargain formulation depends on
an answer to the question: "What did the parties expect?"'" The parties'
expectations will probably be proven by evidence of what was said at the time
the relationship was created. If the parties were specific enough, they may
well have an implied-in-fact contract. As with any contract-based argu-
ment 92 the advantage goes to the person who is more specific in bargaining.
This is the party who knows what she is doing, gets the better legal advice,
and expresses herself more clearly-nearly always the employer. In the end,
the "haves" continue to have. The employer's superior bargaining position
and greater litigation strength will result in her winning more cases than
employees, and the evolution of contract law to protect employees will in fact
have helped very few. Courts began with strict contract rules. Then, to help
employees-those who don't articulate their expectations-courts relaxed the
traditional rules, allowing for liberal implication of terms "in fact." Then
courts went a step further by protecting, by operation of law, even less
articulated expectations. But still parties must prove that the expectations
were there. This last step has provided relief for only a few more employees
than were protected before such efforts at protection.
Employers certainly find no solace in the benefit-of-the-bargain rule, for
it is sufficiently fact-based that no party can predict the outcome of a court
case. The employer remains uncertain about whether a firing will be "legal"
or not. Thus, for only a minimal enhancement of workers' positions, the
wheels of commerce are congested. The benefit of the rule is at best only
barely worth the cost. Schmedmann endorsed the rule only so far as to say
that the benefit-of-bargain idea is as far as the courts can legitimately go; the
rest is up to legislature.'
89. Id. at 747.
90. Id. at 749.
91. And what of the pessimist, who expects to be treated badly? Has he no cause of action
because his expectations were met? According to Larry Ross, Management Consultant and
former CEO, "The most stupid phrase anybody can use in business is loyalty." WORKING 409-10
(Studs Terkel ed., 1974). And this from a person who, as CEO, formerly had as much
bargaining power as any employee can.
92. The jaded populism of the following line of reasoning applies to all confrontations
between unequal parties, and is directed to those who, like Epstein, insist that private agreements
are the best way to protect most people's interests. See supra note 38.
93. Most scholars favor a legislative approach, despite early calls forjudicial activism. See,
e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute,
62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976); Karen Paull, Note, Employment Termination Reform: What Should
a Statute Require Before Termination? Lessons from the French, British and German
Experiences, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. Rv. 619 (1991). For an early call for ajudicial
solution, see Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
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4. Good cause. Other judges,94 usually dissenters," have equated the
obligation imposed by the covenant with an obligation to have good cause for
discharge.' The opinions have not articulated what causes are good,
evidently leaving that for the fact finder. Other common law courts have
refined the covenant by articulating a sliding scale definition97 of good faith
and fair dealing, whereby many factors are taken into account: longevity of
employment, express policies of employer, oral statements, past patterns and
practices, and industry standards. While some of these factors could also
be used to create an implied-in-fact contractual term to discharge only for
good cause, this sliding-scale description of the covenant may be the most
"fair."99 Generally, people expectt0° more the longer they have been
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1816 (1980).
94. See, e.g., Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 720 P.2d 257, 1 Ind. Emp.
Rights Cas. (BNA) 1410, 104 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,589, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2597 (Mont.
1986).
95. See, e.g., Foley v, Interactive Date Corp., 765 P.2d 373,3 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA)
1729, 110 Lab. Cas. (CCII) 55,978 (Cal. 1988) (Broussard, J., dissenting).
96. For three vigorous opinions discussing the difference between good faith and good
cause, see Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191, 5 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1009,
116 Lab. Cas. (CCII) 56,350 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2014 (1991). Judges
Reinhardt, Kozinski and Trott each wrote separate opinions.
97. An early and influential commentator developed the sliding-scale definition:' "What
constitutes bad faith in terminations for unsatisfactory job performance may vary from case to
case because employment at will arrangements cover a broad spectrum of occupations." Note,
supra note 93, at 1840.
Similarly Perritt agrees with the school of thought that obligations evolve over time:
"Under the relational theory, the parties expect that the terms of their relationship will evolve.
There is no need for formalities to validate new practices to make them part of the contract."
Perritt, supra note 72, at 716.
Perritt recalls the phrase of Macaulay and MacNeil that "'parties treat their contract more
like marriages than like one-night stands."' Id. at 713 (quoting Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay,
MacNiel, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 565,
568-69). This analogy is particularly apt in the employment context. Wrongful termination
cases often resemble divorce cases in the haziness of the facts, the viperousness of the parties and
the obviousness, to an observer, of some truth on both sides.
One commentator expects that much of the time good faith will require a good cause for
discharge. Note, supra note 93, at 1836-44.
98. Including this factor demonstrates an ingrained beliefthat one of the primary obligations
of fairness is to treat like cases alike.
99. Several scholars have noted the beauty of a flexible idea of good faith. See, e.g., Note,
supra note 93, at 1840. Certainly, there is no need to insist that employment contracts be either
at will, on one end of the scale, or for cause, on the other end. A balanced, middle ground is
possible and often desirable to both parties.
100. The reference to the expectation interest does not show a uniquely contractual nature
of the obligation. Many tort obligations arise from expectations. Rather the tort vs. contract
distinction turns on the source of the expectation: social (tort) or private (contract). The
practical distinction between tort and contract is the dollar amount which the plaintiff is likely
to recover; this is the distinction which is the source of the rage in the debate. Recently, tax
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around, and cavalier treatment of a six-month probationary employee shocks
us less than identical treatment of a fifty-two-year employee.)°
Other jurists consider that if an employer has a "fair and honest reason,"
good faith exists. 2 Upon examination, a "fair and honest" cause differs so
little from a "good" cause as to justify including these definitions in the same
category. "Honest" reasons must be truthful, but they may well be subjective
and arbitrary reasons for termination. On the other hand, the word "fair" has
an objective component; a fair reason is one a reasonable person would agree
with. While requiring a "fair reason" might be setting a slightly lower
standard than a "good reason" requirement, the jury is still invited to second
guess the employer's reason for firing. Ultimately, the jury is determining
whether an adequate reason existed.
Henry Perritt wrote: "It is a small theoretical step, albeit a major policy
step, to translate 'good faith and fair dealing' into a requirement that
employment be terminated only for legitimate employer related reasons, i.e.,
good cause."' 03 Perritt considered the implied covenant to be a legitimate
limitation of the employer's at will rights."° He pointed out that there is
nothing radical or new about limiting at will rights, which have been limited
since the early labor acts of the 1930s. Nor is the standard of good faith and
fair dealing foreign to the law, for it is comparable to fiduciary obligations
and to the fundamental notion of a prima facie tort which "incorporate[s] the
idea that conduct that is not ordinarily actionable can become actionable
because of the state of mind of the actor." 0 5
Perritt was not blind to the drawbacks of imposing a good-cause
requirement on all employment termination, primarily that "employers will be
discouraged from dismissing employees who should be dismissed, therefore
causing the efficiency of the economic system to suffer."'0 6 But he went on
to advance a Jesuitical reason for adoption of the covenant as a good cause
requirement: "it creates an incentive for the employer community to favor
balanced legislation.' 0 7 He suggested "treat[ing] the covenant as a rebut-
table presumption of good cause, when that seems most consistent with the
consequences have come to light as well. See Redfield v. Insurance Co. of North America, 940
F.2d 542, 120 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,779 (9th Cir. 1991). Note also that in California jury
verdicts have continued to climb despite Foley's abolition of most tort causes of action. See
Brooks v. Hilton Casinos, Inc., 959 F.2d 757, 121 Lab. Cas. 56,892, 7 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas.
(BNA) 507 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 300 (1992).
101. This is echoed in the nation's strong protection of seniority rights. See AFL-CIO-CLC
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
102. Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n, 720 P.2d 257,262, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights
Cas. (BNA) 1410, 104 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,589, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2597 (Mont. 1986).
103. Perritt, supra note 72, at 723.
104. Id. at 708.
105. Id. at 712.
106. Id. at 723.
107. Perritt devotes a great deal of space to how the good-cause rule should work. After
having expended such considerable resources to working out a scheme, does he really just want
a legislature to overturn it?
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employment relationship, and as something else when that seems most ap-
propriate."'
08
5. Not bad faith-excluder definitions. Other courts, rather than
describing the obligations of good faith, seek to define bad faith, often usin
words like "arbitrary, ""9 "malice
" O and "disinterested malevolence.
'51
One concurrence avoided these terms but suggested that bad-faith dismissal is
one "[having] nothing to do with the worker's job performance or the
employer's employment needs.""' This is helpful only if one has a
common notion of what employers' needs are. Further, the raison d'8tre of
a businessperson is to make money either by saving costs or raising prices.
In a competitive economy, the former is the preferred method.
An example is the case of the person fired just before his pension vests.
That worker was not fired for an arbitrary or irrational reason, but rather to
enable the employer to save money. Usually saving employment costs is
considered laudable in the business world. Since no breach of actual contract
exists, why are courts inclined to step in to protect the employee? Again, a
basic sense of fairness would indicate that the rug has been jerked from under
him, that he had a justified, albeit unexpressed, expectation that the employer
would not do that. But undeniably the employer has acted in accordance with
her needs and indeed her very nature.
Another example: an employee is fired because the supervisor is repelled
by the worker's moral standards,' because the supervisor is sexually
jealous,"4 or merely because the supervisor is sick of looking at the worker.
This is an employment-related problem. The firing is subjective, but not
necessarily arbitrary. The employee has apparently so affected the
supervisor's work performance that the supervisor is willing to go though the
unpleasantness of terminating the employment. When the choice is between
the serenity of a supervisor or an underling, a hierarchical society normally
answers that the supervisor's desires come first, and the person lower on the
totem pole must go."'
108. Perritt, supra note 72, at 725.
109. On the other hand, some courts reject the idea that "mere" arbitrariness is synonymous
with bad faith. See Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 479 A.2d 781, 787 n.19, 101 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
55,485, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2163 (Conn. 1984).
110. Id. at 790.
111. Tourville v. Inter-Ocean Ins. Co., 508 A.2d 1263, 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), appeal
denied, 521 A.2d 933 (Pa. 1987).
112. Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 852,2 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 844, 107
Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,825 (Kan. 1987) (Herd, J., concurring). See infra text accompanying
Appendix notes 120-24.
113. Morriss, 738 P.2d at 852. Undue concern with an employee's off duty sexual activity
may constitute an invasion of privacy. E.g., Slohda v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 475 A.2d 618
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
114. Clearyv. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 110 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,998,
115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3030 (Ct. App. 1980).
115. An example may well be found in Wagensellerv. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d
1025, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA)526, 103 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,511, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
3166 (Ariz. 1985). The hospital administration could hardly have been taking the position that
12551992]
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A person taking the position that these firings are in bad faith is making
a series of judgments. He decides, first, that "good" or "acceptable" reasons
are required and, second, that these particular reasons are "bad." He is
questioning whether in private enterprise an employer's personal moral scheme
should be imposed on employees and their off-work activities." 6 He may
also be judging the moral code itself. If the employee is a child molester, his
termination is not shocking even if he is not in a job where he works with
children. If the employee is fired for vacationing in Montana with a female
not his wife, his termination is labeled "arbitrary.""' 7 Perhaps the distinction
is that the employment of a child molester may affect public relations and,
hence, impact business."' This rationale uses capitalism as a refuge for
moral judgmentalism.
Some arbitrary firings are rational. For example, an employer may
decide that if a worker comes in three times with unshined shoes, the worker
will be fired for being lazy and slovenly, even if he does not work with the
public. Certainly, unshined shoes are evidence of imperfect personal
grooming, and imperfect personal grooming may be evidence of sloppiness
and sloth. The employer's test is based in reason although many people
would label the employer's test arbitrary for several reasons. First, unshined
shoes are only one of many examples of carelessness; therefore, the
employer's emphasis on this one criterion seems undue. Second, other reasons
may explain the unshined shoes, including the employee's lack of knowledge
of the importance of shined shoes in the world at large. Finally, if the
employer's "test" is not communicated to the employee at least before the
third unshined day, the employee does not have fair notice of the employer's
obsession.
For many people malice is synonymous with bad faith. Yet, as is pointed
out by the majority of the California Supreme Court, motivation in breach of
public toilet functions, heavy drinking and mooning are job requirements for nurses. See infra
Appendix note 23. But the administration was yielding to the supervisor who was annoyed with
the underling who had apparently conveyed her disapproval of these activities. In this case the
hospital administration's choice may well not have withstood remand, given Arizona's indecent
exposure statute which gave rise to Wagenseller's suit fortortious discharge in violation ofpublic
policy. Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1035.
116. This assumes that the "moral code" is not a euphemism for "religion." Religious
discrimination is obviously prohibited by Title VII.
117. See Morriss, 738 P.2d at 787.
118. According to one commentator:
Courts should consider only the factors that employers can validly require as
conditions of employment ..... The factors [in an employee's personal life] that an
employer should consider depend largely on the type of employee the employer is
considering. For example, employers might properly consider the affiliations of their
salespeople outside the workplace, because the salespeople's social relationships may
directly affect business.
Joanne Sokachitch, Note, Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Illinois: An Application in the
Employment Context, I U. ILL. L. REv. 183, 214-15 (1987) (footnotes omitted). This same
"impact on customers" argument could apply in some communities to an employee who is
becoming known as a womanizer-whether in Montana or elsewhere.
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contract is normally irrelevant." 9 Normally, when a contract is performed
according to its terms, no one chastises a party for making a deal that is good
for itself." If the contract is breached, it is irrelevant whether the breach
is intentional or unintentional, gloating or reluctant. Indeed, an intentional,
greedy breach of contract is often encouraged as "efficient."'' But in the
employment context, some would label such greed "bad faith." And many of
the covenant cases go one step beyond punishing an employer for malicious
breach, for in the classic situations there is no technical breach of con-
tract.' At some point these cases become "malicious compliance" cases.
The employer is blamed for being too technical, for following the word but
not the spirit of the contract.
The employee may not be particularly well protected by any definition
which focuses on the employer's state of mind such as the presence of malice
or honesty. These subjective states of mind can be difficult to prove and
determine especially when various employer agents are involved in the
firing."
6. Honesty in fact. The Model Employment Termination Act"2
defines good faith as "honesty in fact"'25 and imposes that obligation on the
performance and enforcement of the employment contract.' 6 The Act
further provides: "An unconscionable agreement or part of an agreement is
not enforceable."'2 7 The Act requires that good cause be shown for most
terminations of over one-year employees as well.'
Honesty in fact is a limited definition. It works well within the scheme
of the Act, but would provide little or no meaningful protection if it stood
alone as the common law definition of good faith because it provides no
normative standard. Employers would be free to say, "I honestly value money
more than I care about your life," or "I am honestly out to screw you because
I honestly enjoy watching people's lives crumble."
Promulgation of an honesty-in-fact standard would encourage forthright
communication between employers and employees by prohibiting employers
119. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 400, 3 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA)
1729, 110 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,978 (Cal. 1988).
120. An exception to this generalization is the doctrine of unconscionability. Nevada's
definition of bad faith harkens to the unconscionability doctrine, for it defines bad faith to
include malice and extreme differential of bargaining position. K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732
P.2d 1364, 2 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 56, 106 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,683 (Nev. 1987).
121. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS oF Tm LAW 107-08 (3d ed. 1986).
122. See, e.g., Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas.
(BNA) 961, 113 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,136 (Idaho 1989).
123. Schmedmann, supra note 79, at 1133.
124. See supra note 5.
125. Model Employment Termination Act § 1(5).
126. Id. § 4(e).
127. Id. § 4(e).
128. Various proposed state statutes, and one existing statute, require good faith and fair
dealing in the employment context. None of these legislative works defines when blad faith
occurs or, alternatively, what amounts to good faith.
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from lying about the reasons for the firing.'29 Many employers soft pedal
dismissals in order to reduce the amount of emotional distress to each party,
to avoid confrontation and to allow the employee to save face and to maintain
some self esteem.
7. Community standards/business practice. Another definition focuses
on community standards or "accepted notions of business ethics.' 130  It
requires proof of facts which would also help prove an implied-in-fact
contractual term limiting the employer's right to discharge. If such facts are
found, perhaps the implied-in-fact contract cause of action would be more
straight-forward, and the more convoluted covenant formulation could be
avoided.
The mixture of contract workers, civil servants, union workers and at will
workers in a given community -provides such a wide range of "accepted"
practices among employers that this standard may well be unworkable. It also
leads to reinforcement of the status quo-whatever that may be-which
reformers might find undesirable.
8. Fair Dealing. The fair dealing aspect of the covenant, usually ignored
by the courts, has attracted many academic commentators.' It reinforces
an administrative law model which requires rules and process.'32 The law
could impose certain protective procedures upon the private workplace. At
least one warning (except for egregious transgressions), notice and an
opportunity to be heard are probably minimal requirements to a collective
understanding of fairness. Indeed, arbitrators, who are called upon to
determine good cause in the context of collective bargaining agreements, often
include some procedural fair play as a condition to a finding of good cause to
terminate.'33
VIII. SURVEY OF STATE COURT ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE THE
COVENANT IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
Following this Article is an appendix containing a state-by-state
discussion of how state courts have considered whether the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing should be used in the common law as a tool to restrict
the at will doctrine. Thirty-seven states have refused to allow an action on the
129. Missourihas codified a requirement that employers explain reasons for discharge, under
certain circumstances. Mo. REV. STAT. § 290.140 (1986). For a decision expressly declining
to impose an honesty-in-fact standard, see Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908, 115
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 5127 (Mass. 1982). See also infra text accompanying Appendix notes 144-48.
But see Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 720 P.2d 257, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas.
(BNA) 1410, 104 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,589, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2597 (Mont.), appeal
dismissed, 479 U.S. 980 (1986) (requiring fair and honest reason); infra Appendix note 175.
130. See, e.g., Koehrer v. Superior Ct., 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 829 (Ct. App. 1986).
131. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Clark, Note, Ensuring Good Faith in Dismissals, 63 TEX. L.
REv. 285, passim (1984).
132. Id. at 298-300.
133. See infra note 138.
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covenant in an at will situation." 4 Fourteen states have allowed an
obligation of good faith in some form to restrict the employer's at will
rights.
135
The survey reveals how vague the definition of the covenant is in the
minds of jurists, no matter whether the individual judge is friend or foe of the
covenant. The cases cited also reveal the degree to which judges are
uncomfortable with the harshness of the at will doctrine.'36 Even when
judges refuse to allow recovery to a plaintiff, their very willingness to recite
the at times egregious facts bespeaks a human empathy for the discharged
employee. As a result, judges often reach for sometimes far-fetched rules of
law to reprieve or assuage the employee. Clutching at rules leads to the
bending or even breaking these rules.
IX. CONCLUSION
Rather than risk the manipulation of existing doctrine, the law should
move toward a frank good cause requirement, leaving behind the harshness of
at will and the imprecision of the covenant. At first glance "good cause" may
seem as hard to define as good faith;3 7 but, labor arbitrators have long been
134. This count includes states which have declined to take a position on the covenant. See
infra survey of Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
135. This count is the most generous possible, for it includes bad faith actions even if not
predicated on the covenant, and it includes jurisdictions which allow covenant and public policy
actions to sound together. Note that New Mexico requires good faith but will not allow an
action on the covenant, hence was counted in each category. See infra survey of Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico and North Carolina.
136. See, e.g., Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So. 2d 1086, 2 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas.
(BNA) 805, 107 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,812 (Miss. 1987). The opening paragraph of the opinion
states:
This appeal from Chancery Court of Forrest County presents us with a story
all the more depressing for being sadly familiar. Willis Perry served the Sears,
Roebuck organization faithfully and with distinction for some twenty years. He was
almost within sight of retirement when Sears unceremoniously dumped him because
of a personality conflict with his immediate supervisor. This is not the first time we
have taken note of corporate callousness towards loyal workers. See, e.g., our
remarks in Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So. 2d 247 (Miss. 1985). In that case, we
observed with chagrin that "the attendant rights and burdens are imposed by law, not
by sympathy or outrage." 481 So. 2d at 249. It is the same in today's case. The
Golden Rule, unfortunately, is not a rule of law.
Id. at 1087.
137. Certainly a good cause contract is no guarantee that litigation will be avoided. For an
interesting factual debate on the meaning of good cause, when interpreted in good faith, see
Green v. City of Oceanside, 239 Cal. Rptr. 470, 121 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,873 (Ct. App. 1987).
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able to provide a working definition of good cause.' Similarly, the
drafters of the Model Employee Termination Act have managed to articulate
a good cause standard that addresses both an employee'sjob performance and
an employer's economic necessities.'39 On the other hand, despite the
combined efforts of the scholars cited at the beginning of this Article and the
case law that follows, a generalized understanding of good faith has not been
forthcoming.
At first blush, a "good cause" requirement appears to be a drastic change
in existing law, 4 ° but, actually, most of the industrialized workplace has
long worked under such a system. Most collective bargaining agreements
138. See Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 555 (1964) (Daugherty, Arb.).
Arbitrator Daugherty listed a series of questions "for learning whether [the employer had just and
proper cause for disciplining an employee." According to Arbitrator Daugherty:
A "no" answer to any one or more of the following questions normally signifies that
just and proper cause [for termination] did not exist. In other words, such "no"
means that the employer's disciplinary decision contained one or more elements of
arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and/or discriminatory action to such an extent
that said decision constituted an abuse of managerial discretion warranting the
arbitrator to substitute his judgment for that of the employer.
1. Did the company give to the employee forewarning or foreknowledge of the
possible or probably disciplinary consequences of the employee's conduct?
2. Was the company's rule or managerial order reasonably related to the orderly,
efficient, and safe operation of the Company's business?
3. Did the company, before administering discipline to an employee, make an effort
to discover whether the employee did in fact violate or disobey a rule or order of
management?
4. Was the company's investigation conducted fairly and objectively?
5. At the investigation did the 'judge" obtain substantial evidence or proof that the
employee was guilty as charged?
6. Has the company applied its rules, orders, and penalties evenhandedly and
without discrimination to all employees?
7. Was the degree of discipline administered by the company in a particular case
reasonably related to (a) the seriousness of the employee's proven offense and (b)
the record of the employee in his service with the company?
This list demonstrates how "fair dealing" which might also be known as "due process," is
intertwined with good cause and good faith.
139. Section 1(4) reads:
"Good cause" means (i) a reasonable basis for termination of an employee's
employment in view of relevant factors and circumstances, which include the
employee's duties, responsibilities, conduct, job performance, and employment
record, and the appropriateness of termination for the conduct involved, or (ii) the
exercise of business judgment in good faith by the employer in setting its economic
goals and determining methods to achieve those goals, organizing or reorganizing
operations, discontinuing or divesting operations or parts of operations, determining
the size of its work force and the nature of the positions filled by its work force, and
determining and changing standards of performance for positions.
140. Schmedmann, supra note 79, at 1132-34.
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allow only good cause terminations. 4' Federal and state statutory restric-
tions on "bad reason" terminations and the widely recognized public policy
tort have caused most companies to revise their termination policies so that
they can articulate why and how most employees were terminated. In other
words, fear of lawsuits has created the desirable result of self-imposed fairness
and "just cause" requirements. Codifying these requirements will have the
beneficial effect of letting all parties know where they stand.
43
The United States is alone among industrialized nations not to provide the
private workforce with generalized protection from unjust discharge.' 44  It
is time for the United States to come into the fold and provide employers with
stable rules and workers with meaningful protection.
141. On the federal level these include the NLRA, Title VII, the ADEA, ADA and various
whistleblower protections. Most states have enacted counterparts to these rules.
142. See, e.g., Special Report: Auditing the Termination Process, INDIVIDUAL EMPLOY-
MBNT RIGHTs NEWvSLETER (BNA) Vol. 6, No. 10, May 21, 1991, at 1; see also Perritt, supra
note 72, at 708, Christopher Conte, Who Fires?, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1992, at Al ("Some
companies are giving up the right to dismiss employees at will."). On the other hand, a Rand
study indicates that pro-employee rulings are resulting in fewer hirings. Milo Geyeliln &
Jonathan M. Moses, Rulings on Wrongful Firing Curb Hiring, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1992, at B3.
143. There are, of course, costs to every course of action. Meddling in the workplace and
interference with employers decision-making may affectthe demand for labor. Marginal workers
may feel the pinch. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Price of the Public Policy Modification of the
Terminable-at-Will Rule, 34 LAB. L.J. 581 (1983).
144. Samuel Estreicher, Unjust DismissalLaws: Some Cautionary Notes, 33 AM. J. COMP.
L. 310 (1985). Those who are subjected to illegal termination in this country and who go on
to win lawsuits are, however, often given much greater compensation than their foreign
counterparts. In other words, in America fewer workers grab the golden ring but when they do
it is of higher carat.
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Appendix: Survey of State Law
Alabama
In Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell,' the Alabama Supreme Court
reaffirmed the strong doctrine of at will employment in that state.2 The only
way to rebut the at will presumption is by establishing contrary express or
implied-in-fact contractual provisions.
The employment relationship at issue in Hoffman-La Roche was governed
by a handbook, which the court was willing to use to create implied-in-fact
contractual provisions.3 One of these provisions was that the "policies and
practices expressed therein [in the handbook] would be 'applied fairly."' 4 It
was on this provision that the court rested its finding that the employer had
an obligation to act fairly.5
The court went on to cite another reason why the employer should act
fairly, namely the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which Alabama law
reads into every contract.6 The court cited Corbin to define this "as simply
'the obligation to preserve the spirit of the bargain rather than the form,'7
and later "'this principle of justice forbids attempts by the actor to get more
for himself than the other party reasonably contemplated giving him at the
time the contractual relationship was entered into, absent good cause." 8
The employee in Hoffman-LaRoche had a bone disease which caused his
once-stellar work performance to deteriorate. Nonetheless, his supervisor
apparently advised him to keep working rather than take sick leave. The
employee was ultimately terminated for unacceptable work performance.9
The court held that the employer violated the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing "when it discharged [the employee] for unsatisfactory performance
even though it was aware of his physical disability to perform satisfactorily.'"
The reasoning of the court is unclear. Although the tone of the court's
legal analysis is supportive of at will, the finding is strikingly pro-employ-
1. 512 So. 2d 725, 2 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 739 (Ala. 1987).
2. Id. at 728. The court even rejected the public policy tort. Id. at 728 n.1.
3. Id. at 733.
4. Id. at 737.
5. Id. at 739.
6. Id. at 738.
7. Id. (citing ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONmACTS § 654A(A) (1984 Supp.)).
8. Id. (citing CORBIN, supra note 7, § 654E(A)). Corbin's language is striking in its
idealism, especially if it is applied to one-time business dealings.
9. Id. at 727. The supervisor denied the employee's version of the facts at trial.
10. Id. at 738.
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ee." Taken to an extreme, it could result in numerous disabled employees
being carried on the company rolls long after they could perform. 2
Alaska
In the 1983 case of Mitford v. de Lasala,3 this jurisdiction recognized
that the covenant exists in employment contracts, 4 citing sales commissions
cases.' Breach of the covenant sounds in contract.' 6 A 1986 case estab-
lished that the covenant required an employer to treat like employees alike,' 7
although a later case made the point that the implied covenant cannot change
express terms of an agreement between employer and employee.' Another
1986 case acknowledged the public policy aspects of the covenant. 9
Three years later, the Alaska Supreme Court explained that the covenant
requires that neither party do anything that will injure the right of the other
to receive benefits of the agreement, and that each party act honestly toward
11. The court appears to mean what it says, citing other cases allowing employee disability
as an excuse for contractual performance. Id. (citing Duff v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 362
So. 2d 886 (Ala. 1978), quoting American Chain & Castle Co., 48 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1369
(1967)).
12. For a more standard statement of the general practice regarding legitimate employee
illness, see the words of Arbitrator Marlin M. Valz in Louisville Water Co., 77 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 1049, 1052 (1981):
Illness, injury, or other incapacitation by forces beyond the control of the employee
are mitigating circumstances, excuse reasonable periods of absence, and are
important factors in determining whether absences are excessive. However, if an
employee has demonstrated over a long period of time an inability due to chronic
bad health or proneness to injury to maintain an acceptable attendance record, an
employer is justified in terminating the relationship, particularly where it has sought
through counselling and warnings to obtain an improvement in attendance.
Note that in Louisville Water the employee was reinstated because "he may well have been lulled
into a false sense ofjob security." Id. at 1052 n.660. This may well have been the reasoning of
the Alabama Supreme Court in Hoffman, but the court does not make it clear in its statements
of either fact or law. The repeated failure of courts to be precise as to how the covenant is
breached is the source of the author's conclusion that the covenant concept should be dropped
for something that provides better guidance.
13. 666 P.2d 1000, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4254 (Alaska 1983).
14. Id. at 1007. In Mitford, an employee was fired when he asserted his rights under a
written profit sharing agreement. Id.
15. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4658
(Mass. 1977) is the classic commission salesman case.
16. Walt v. State, 751 P.2d 1345, 1354,3 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 649, 128 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2635 (Alaska 1988); ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1153, 3 Ind. Emp.
Rights Cas. (BNA) 808, 122 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 57,045 (Alaska 1988).
17. Rutledge v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 727 P.2d 1050, 1056, 105 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
55,622 (Alaska 1986) (citing Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241 (1989)).
18. Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 789, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas.
(BNA) 1204, 116 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,416 (Alaska 1989).




the other with respect to the contract.2° Although the court stated that good
faith and good cause were not the same thing, it also stated that managerial
discretion was permitted as long as it was reasonable and exercised in good
faith.2 By adding "reasonableness" into this formulation, the court is
inviting the jury to bring its judgment into the personnel office. The line
between good cause and reasonable cause is hard to draw since any generous
definition of good cause includes all rational reasons for termination. A
reader of the opinion might well find this requirement tantamount to a good
cause requirement, which is probably unavoidable in nearly any attempt to
give meaningful content to the covenant.
Arizona
The leading case of Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital2 is
one of the best reasoned opinions addressing whether the covenant can or
should be implied in the employment relationship. An employee, her female
supervisor and others went on a rafting trip, during which the employee
refused to enter into raucous group activities.' The court was not afraid to
admit that it was limiting and modifying the at will doctrine. The court
recognized that by allowing a cause of action for firings in violation of public
policy, it had determined that an employee could be fired for "good cause or
no cause, but not for 'bad' cause."'24 The court placed terminations in
violation of the covenant within the category of "bad cause."25
The Arizona judges provided this oft-cited explanation of what the
covenant means in the case of an at will contract:
[The covenant] protects the right of the parties to an agreement to receive
the benefits of the agreement that they have entered into.... In the case
of an employment-at-will contract, it may be said that the parties have
agreed, for example, that the employee will do the work required by the
employer and that the employer will provide the necessary working
conditions and pay the employee for work done. What cannot be said is
that one of the agreed benefits to the at will employee is a guarantee of
continued employment or tenure. The very nature of the at will agreement
precludes any claim for a prospective benefit. Either employer or employee
may terminate the contract at any time.
... The covenant does not protect the employee from a 'no cause'
termination because tenure was never a benefit inherent in the at will
agreement. The covenant does protect an employee from a discharge based
on an employer's desire to avoid the payment of benefits already earned by
the employee, such as the sales commissions in Fortune, supra, but not the
20. Akers, 753 P.2d at 1156-57.
21. Id. at 1157.
22. 710 P.2d 1025, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 526, 103 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 155,511,
119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3166 (Ariz. 1985).
23. Id. at 1029. These activities included "public urination, defecation, and bathing, heavy
drinking, and 'grouping up' with other rafters," and "mooning" while performing "Moon River."
Id.
24. Id. at 1033.
25. Id. at 1035.
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tenure required to earn the pension and retirement benefits in Cleary, supra.
Thus, plaintiff here has a right to receive the benefits that were a part of her
employment agreement with defendant Hospital. To the extent, however,
that the benefits represent a claim for prospective employment, her claim
must fail.26
This court is commendable for its bravery. It unabashedly modified the
at will relationship in Arizona and created a new rule on a clean slate. The
new rule is a step toward balancing the social and economic concerns of
business and workers.27 Nonetheless, this court, like so many, was afraid to
ring the bell loudly to proclaim its new rules; it muffled its resounding ruling
by continuing to characterize employment relationships in Arizona as "at
will. 28
Arkansas
Causes of action for breach of the covenant appear to be congruent with
public policy suits, both sounding in contract.29
California
California courts have been the home of much of the change and discus-
sion regarding incursions on the at will doctrine, including the interjection of
the covenant into the employment context.
Like several judicially created doctrines, the use of the covenant in the
employment contract has its genesis in a footnote.3" In Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 31 Justice Tobriner wrote of a potential tort if an employee
were discharged in violation of the employer's obligations of good faith and
fair dealing. The court of appeals elevated this into the text in Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc.,32 in which it overruled a demurrer in a case alleging
various types of wrongful termination actions.33 The court allowed a tort
26. Id. at 1040.
27. But see supra text accompanying Article note 92.
28. Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1033. See supra text accompanying Article note 45.
29. Smith v. American Greetings Corp., 804 S.W.2d 683, 684, 6 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas.
(BNA) 1039, 121 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,815 (Ark. 1991); Sterling Drug Inc. v. Oxford, 743
S.W.2d 380, 384, 3 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1060 (Ark. 1988). See also Lucas v. Brown
& Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 388, 101 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
55,474, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2744 (8th Cir. 1984).
30. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (Stone, J.).
31. 610 P.2d 1330, 1337 n.12, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 102, 121 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
56,822, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3119 (Cal. 1980).
32. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 448, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 122, 110 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
55,998, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3030 (1980).
33. The court allowed causes ofaction for estoppel based on longevity of plaintiff's service
along with express employer policies, a public policy cause of action, and conspiracy causes of
action regarding wrongful interference with business relationships and wrongful inducement of
breach of contract. Indeed the covenant language in Cleary has been called an "alternative
holding" of the case. Croisier v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d. 1132, 1137, 115
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3585 (1983).
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cause of action for breach of the covenant, citing Tobriner's Tameny footnote,
Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and several earlier
California cases which acknowledged the covenant. The Cleary court quoted
language from a 1934 case:34 "It is equally well settled that the employer
must act in good faith; and where there is evidence tending to show that the
discharge was due to reasons other than dissatisfaction with the services the
question is one for the jury.
35
By quoting this language, Cleary seems to equate good faith with a
limited concept of good cause, for the employer is absolved only if its reason
for dismissal was dissatisfaction with services. The Cleary court further
confused the definition of the covenant by suggesting that the covenant
imposes more and more weighty obligations on the employer with the passage
of time. The court identified two factors of "paramount importance" which
must be satisfied before equating the duty imposed by the covenant with a
duty to fire only for cause: longevity of service by plaintiff 6 and express
policies of the employer. The court also mentioned "the continuing trend
toward recognition by the courts and the Legislature of certain implied
contract rights to job security" and equitable concepts of estoppel." Thus the
public policy tort, the estoppel doctrine, and the covenant all converged in this
decision.38
Four years later the appellate court in Rulon-Miller v. International
Business Machines Corp.39 spent considerable time listing the duties imposed
by the covenant, including that parties "deal openly and fairly with each
other." For employers this means treating like cases alike and following their
own rules and regulations.4" This interpretation, subsequently followed by
34. Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 453 (citing Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328
P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958), quoting Coats v. General Motors Corp., 39 P.2d 838 (Cal. Ct. App.
1934)).
35. Coats involved a situation similar to that of Lady Duff-Gordon, for the satisfaction
contract involved "fancy, taste, sensibility and judgment." Coats, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 453 n.5.
The California Supreme Court later referred to the Coats authority as providing merely a "'hint
that an employer may need to demonstrate good faith."' Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765
P.2d 373, 390-91, 3 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1729, 110 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,978 (Cal.
1988).
36. As California law developed, the longevity factor was no longer deemed essential to the
cause of action. Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 262, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights
Cas. (BNA) 1854, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2152 (1985); Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors,
152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 478-79, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1803, 100 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
55,454, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2520 (1984).
37. Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 455.
38. Id. at 455-56. Or, in the words of a subsequent decision, "the concepts of ordinary
breach of employment contract (i.e., breach of an implied promise not to terminate except for
good cause), tortious discharge (i.e. discharge in violation of public policy), and "bad faith"
(breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing) were rather badly admixed in
Cleary." Koehrer v. Superior Ct., 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1168 (1986).
39. 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 405, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3309
(1984).
40. Id. at 247-48. See DeHorney v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 85 Daily J. 879
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other appellate courts, apparently created tort liability for companies which did
not follow their own policies, rules, regulations, and handbook procedures.
41
These courts were perilously close to creating tort liability for breach of
implied-in-fact contract.
More thoughtful courts required plaintiffs to prove "bad faith action ex-
traneous to the contract, combined with the obligor's intent to frustrate the
enjoyment of contract rights. 42 Punitive damages could then be sought on
top of the tort recovery, so that the proof was three tiered: first, breach of the
policies, which might well amount to breach of express or implied-in-fact
contract; second, bad faith; third, oppression, fraud or malice for the purposes
of obtaining exemplary damages.
43
Another California appellate court opinion sheds more light on the
meaning of the covenant. In Koehrer v. Superior Ct.,4 the court first
discussed the role of the covenant in general business contracts. The court
stressed that the obligations imposed by the covenant were "separate and apart
from those consensually agreed to" and that they were "imposed by law as
normative values of society." 45 These obligations govern "the manner in
which the contractual obligations must be discharged-fairly and in good
faith. " 46 Again, the specific nature of the obligations depends not only upon
"the nature and purpose of the underlying contract" but also upon the
"legitimate expectations of the parties arising from the contract."'47 Koehrer
reaffirmed Cleary's position that these expectations turned not only on who
agreed to what but also on longevity and past practice.
Koehrer distinguished breach of contract from breach of the covenant:
It is sufficient to recognize that a party to a contract may incur tort
remedies when, in addition to breaching the contract, it seeks to shield itself
from liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the
contract exists. [Examples include] ... adopting a "stonewall" position
("see you in court") without probable cause and with no belief in the
existence of a defense .... offend[ing] accepted notions of business
ethics. 4
F.2d 459, 466, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 897 (9th Cir. 1989).
41. See, e.g., Gray v. Superior Ct., 181 Cal. App. 3d 813, 821 (1986). Note the confusion
here between the implied-in-fact contract and the implied-in-law covenant.
42. Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250,263, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA)
1854, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2152 (1985).
43. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1969). See Michael H. Cohen, Comment, Reconstructing
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing As a Tort, 73 CAL. L. REv.
1291, 1325-26 (1985) for a position that punitive damages are inappropriate when tort recovery
is allowed. See also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 399 n.35, 3 Ind. Emp.
Rights Cas. (BNA) 1729, 110 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,978 (Cal. 1988).
44. 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155 (1986).
45. Id. at 1168.
46. Id. at 1169.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1170 (quoting Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 206 Cal.
Rptr. 354, 363 (1984)).
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In Koehrer, a written contract of employment had existed for a specified
term of one year. Obviously, application of Koehrer's rules to the at will
context becomes problematic.49 In firing the employee, the employer is not
denying the existence of the contract but is asserting its contractual rights,
albeit presumed, to fire for any reason.
The second part of the Koehrer definition brings "accepted notions of
business ethics" into the factual analysis. This leads to the question of
whether the at will presumption is a fiction which does not reflect actual
business ethics, personnel practice, or worker expectations, or whether the
presumption is an accurate articulation of the intent of the parties.50
The Koehrer court then discussed the covenant specifically in the
employment context, unfortunately using the very terms it was trying to define
but apparently emphasizing "honesty in fact and law:"
If the employer merely disputes his liability under the contract by asserting
in good faith and with probable cause that good cause existed for discharge,
the implied covenant is not violated and the employer is not liable in tort.
El If, however, the existence of good cause for discharge is asserted by the
employer without probable cause and in bad faith, that is, without a good
faith belief that good cause for discharge in fact exists, the employer has
tortiously attempted to deprive the employee of the benefits of the
agreement, and an action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing will lie.
51
After nearly a decade of uncertainty, the California Supreme Court finally
spoke on the matter.5 2 The Foley decision delineated the three theories of
wrongful discharge recovery in California: public policy tort, implied-in-fact
contract, and covenant. Regarding breach of the covenant claims, the decision
greatly changed the stakes in the litigation by declaring that the action would
sound in contract, not tort. 3 However, Foley's outcome was not entirely a
49. At least one subsequent decision refused to allow a claim based on the covenant where
the written employment agreement contained an at will clause. Other courts did not bar such
claims. Compare Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem., 86 Daily J. D.A.R. 3923 (Dec. 10,
1986) with Ketchu v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 86 Daily J. D.A.R. 3879 (Nov. 30, 1986).
50. See supra text accompanying Article notes 39-40.
51. Koehrer, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 1171 (emphasis added), questioned in Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 390-91, 3 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1729, 110 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
55,978 (Cal. 1988).
52. For a survey of pre-Foley law on the covenant in California, see Edward Haggerty,
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 14 W. ST. U. L. Rv. 445
(1987).
53. Foley, 765 P.2d at 388. Until then, wrongful termination torts had been called the Torts
of the 80s. Ever-rising jury verdicts had lit up the dreams of plaintiffs' lawyers and had
darkened the nightmares of corporate CEOs. The Foley court called upon the legislature to
impose tort liability if it wished. Id. at 401. The dissent's reaction to this suggestion reveals
the markedly different political perspectives on the court. After Foley, objected Justice
Broussard, "the burden of seeking legislative change, which was previously on employer and
insurers, two well organized and financed groups, is now on the unorganized worker." Id. at
411-12 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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management victory for the court also reaffirmed that the covenant may be
imposed in all contracts and disapproved Cleary and its progeny only so far
as they permitted tort remedies for breach of the covenant.54 The failure of
several of those cases to reconcile the covenant with the at will presumption
remains unremedied after Foley.
The majority of the Foley court adopted Arizona's language from
Wagenseller5 that the covenant "protects only the parties' right to receive the
benefit of their agreement."56 The Foley majority discussed the lack of a
clear definition in other formulations of the covenant. The majority did not
share the view of some commentators that the flexibility of the definition is
desirable, for it worried that jurors would impose "'their own standards of
fairness rather than the legal instructions provided by the judge. . . [ ] Jurors
can easily identify with the worker who has received a pink slip."' The
Foley majority was troubled by various formulations, including those offered
by the Koehrer and Khanna courts. 9 The court rejected as too subjective a
test whereby plaintiff would need to prove: "'(1) assertion of a right or denial
of an obligation (2) made in bad faith (with actual knowledge that the claim
or denial has no foundation) and unreasonably (where a reasonable person
under the circumstances would find the claim or denial groundless) (3) that
obstructs the injured party's ability to receive the substitutionary value of the
agreement.""'6  The court agreed that the facts in Cleary provided an
example of one way in which an employer might violate the covenant61 and
concurred with Summers that the term "good faith" is best understood as an
excluder, taking on specific meaning in particular contexts.62
While it rejected several approaches to the covenant, the Foley majority
provided little positive guidance regarding what the covenant adds to an at
will contract. The majority implied that the covenant would be read into at
will situations by explaining what the covenant would not mean in that
context. The court wrote, "[W]ith regard to an at will employment relation-
ship, breach of the implied covenant cannot logically be based on a claim that
a discharge was made without good cause... . Because the implied covenant
protects only the parties' right to receive the benefit of their agreement, and,
in an at-will relationship there is no argument to terminate only for good
cause, the implied covenant standing alone cannot be read to impose such a
duty.
63
54. Id. at 401 n.42.
55. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas.
(BNA) 526, 103 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,511, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3166 (Ariz. 1985).
56. Foley, 765 P.2d at 400 n.39.
57. Id. at 399.
58. Id. at 399 n.36 (quoting William B. Gould IV, Stemming the Tide, 13 EMP. REL. L.J.
404, 406-07 (1988)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 399 n.35 (quoting Cohen, supra note 42, at 1305).
61. Id. at 400.
62. Id. at 400 n.39.
63. Id. A federal court has summarized Foley as saying that under California law "when
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The Foley dissenters strongly urged that the bad faith tort existed and
should continue to exist. Justice Broussard suggested the following test for
determining when the covenant is breached:
[A] suitable test is simple to describe: an employer acts in bad faith in
discharging an employee if and only if he does not believe he has a legal
right to discharge the employee....
The distinction between contract and tort is between a discharge done in
good faith, where the employer believes he has a legal right to discharge
the worker, and deliberate, arbitrary violation of the employee's rights.
[.. T]he majority argument.. . makes no sense unless the majority
believe[s] that there should be no distinction between innocent and
malicious breach-that the employer who maliciously and arbitrarily fires
a ivorker knowing that he has no right to do so should pay no more in
damages than the employer who believed in good faith that he had a right
to fire the worker-and in particular that the bad faith employer should not
pay for the suffering he knowingly and deliberately caused. 64
This "simple test" would lead to peculiar results if applied in an at will
context, in which an employer has a legal right to discharge for good reason,
bad reason, or no reason at all. The only exceptions to this are certain "bad"
reasons prohibited by federal or state statutes or by state public policy tort
common law rules. Obviously, if implied-in-fact or express contractual
obligations exist, limiting the employer's right to fire, the contract is not at
will. Therefore, the employer in an at will context should always and
correctly believe it has a legal right to discharge. Would Justice Broussard
say that the covenant then adds nothing to the employer's obligations?
Even in situations which are not at will, it is not clear what the bad faith
tort adds to plaintiff's recovery besides tort damages. Believers in the
separation of powers might be troubled at the embellishment of statutory
remedies with common law tort recovery. Adherents to traditional jurispru-
dence would find even more shocking the addition of tort damage to any
breach of contract case. If the employer knows that a contract-express or
implied-in-fact-prohibits the termination and terminates the employee
nonetheless, he acts without believing he has a legal right to terminate. Justice
Broussard would find him liable for the bad faith tort. Justice Broussard
rejected any concept of efficient breach in the employment context and
attached. a social/moral obligation to the employment contract. He also
parties have agreed that their contract is terminable at the will of either of them .... , the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be invoked by either party to prevent a court from
enforcing the terms of the contract." DeHomey v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 879
F.2d 459, 466, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 897 (9th Cir. 1989). This summary was adopted
and inaccurately broadened by defendants in a subsequent federal district court who asserted,
"California courts have refused to find a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
where the relationship between the employee and the employer is at will." Siddoway v. Bank
of Am., 748 F. Supp. 1456, 1460, 122 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,953 (N.D. Cal. 1990). The
Siddoway defendant's statement overlooks that some breach of the covenant could be asserted
with respect to another provision of the at will contract.
64. Foley, 765 P.2d at 409-10 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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equated "intentional" breach with "malicious and arbitrary" breach, when in
fact each of those words has a distinct meaning.
The Foley dissents also highlight the variance in judicial tolerance levels
for uncertainty. While the majority was troubled by the indeterminacy of the
phrase "good faith," Justice Broussard pointed out that many words, like
"reasonable," are used without undue discomfort in the law." Similarly,
Justice Kaufman considered that the appellate courts had provided guidelines
sufficient to delineate a cause of action, and he went on to debunk the "flood
of litigation" argument.6
After Foley, California law is in conformity with the most restrictive
view of the covenant although, by giving some recognition to the covenant,
the California high court has provided more protection to workers than they
receive in the majority of states. But, the viewpoint of the dissenting judges
and of the appellate courts continues to be instructive in determining the
potential parameters of the covenant and its value in the workplace.
Colorado
Strikingly little authority on the covenant exists. A court of appeals
refused to recognize the covenant67 without explanation other than citation
to a pre-Wagenseller Arizona case68 and Illinois' Criscione.69
Connecticut
In Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc.,7" an erudite opinion covering
four centuries of legal history, the Connecticut court accepted the concept of
a covenant attaching to the employment relationship without committing itself
to what the covenant would mean.7' The judges expressed concern over the
lack of precision in the concept, noting the defendant's criticism of the
covenant as "too amorphous, permitting juries to police managerial decisions
concerning control over the workforce guided by vague concepts of public
morality rather than principles of law."7" It can be inferred that the majority
also worried that plaintiffs who evoke sympathy would be unduly reward-
ed.73 The court devoted some time to explaining the definition supplied by
its neighbor Massachusetts,74 but did not itself adopt a definition other than
65. Id. at 410 n.10 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 417 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). In particular Justice Kaufman found the Koehrer
standard "fully adequate." Id.
67. Pittman v. Larson Distrib. Co., 724 P.2d 1379, 1385-86 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
68. Daniel v. Magna Copper Co., 620 P.2d 699, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4326 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1980).
69. Criscionev Sears, Roebuck& Co., 384 N.E.2d 91, 115 L.R.R.M.(BNA) 4224 (I11. App.
Ct. 1978).
70. 479 A.2d781, 101 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,485, 117 L.R.R.M.(BNA)2163 (Conn. 1984).
71. Id. at 786-87.
72. Id. at 786.
73. Id. at 786-87 n.19.
74. Id. at 787-88 (citing Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
5127 (Mass. 1982)). The Connecticut court described the Massachusetts position as follows:
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to insist that the covenant "cannot be predicated simply upon the absence of
good cause for a discharge."75 The court made clear that in essence the
covenant's requirements amount to a public *policy standard.76
One judge dissented from the majority's view of the covenant, finding it
too restrictive." He suggested focusing on the good faith aspect of the
covenant, leaving the fair dealing factor for another day.78 He suggested that
the good faith covenant entitles parties to expect no bad faith79 and further
declared that an arbitrary dismissal is a bad faith dismissal.8"
Subsequent decisions indicate that Connecticut has maintained the
congruency between breach of the covenant and breach of an important public
policy."
Delaware
Until very recently, Delaware was one of the most resoundingly at will
states, but a 1991 decision opened the door to actions on the covenant. In a
decision technically unreported but appearing in Lexis and Westlaw, the
Delaware Court of Chancery approved actions on the covenant by at will
employees.8 2 Such suits will sound (1) when bad faith or malice is present
in the firing, or (2) when it is clear from what was expressly agreed upon that
the parties would have agreed to proscribe the act later complained of as
breach of the implied covenant of good faith, had they thought to negotiate
with respect to that matter.83 It may well be that in describing this second
situation the court was articulating an implied-in-fact covenant, but the court's
language was extremely protective of inarticulate contractors.
In 1992 the Delaware Supreme Court made clear what the earlier court
merely hinted at. In Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc.,4 the court stated
that every employment contract made under Delaware law includes an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.85 The court held that a fired
employee stated a claim for breach of the covenant when the employer had
"[A] breach of good faith implies an overreaching by the employer who takes advantage of its
superior bargaining power and deprives the employee of'compensation that is clearly identifiable
and is related to the employee's past service."' Id. at 788 (quoting Cort, 431 N.E.2d at 910).
See also infra text accompanying notes 144-48.
75. Magnan, 479 A.2d at 788.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 792 (Parskey, J., concurring and dissenting).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 793.
81. See, e.g., Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 513 A.2d 66, 106 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,713
(Conn. 1986).
82. Manchester v. Narragnsett Capital, Inc., No. 10822, 1989 Del. Ch. Lexis 141, at *27
(Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1989).
83. Id. at *27-29.
84. 606 A.2d 96,7 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 781, 121 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,900 (Del.
1992).
85. Id. at 101.
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lied during the initial employment interview byZ representing that the position
was permanent when it was only temporary.86 The court explained that at
will contracts could still be terminated for legitimate business reasons, even
if highly subjective.87 Rather the cause of action redresses terminations
motivated by bad faith.8
Florida
In another state which maintains a strict at will rule, the courts have
refused to allow any "good faith" restriction on an employer's right to
discharge employees.89 One court found it "difficult and inappropriate to
make civil action dependent on motive or intent of the defendant."9" In a
case where a written contract specified employment for a definite term
conditioned upon the employer's satisfaction with the employee's performance
during the term, an appellate court found that the employer had an obligation
of good faith.9'
Payment of commissions earned prior to termination was required when
the claim was supported by an oral contract and when the jury found there
was no recognized custom in the industry precluding such post-termination
compensation. 2
Georgia
The courts of this state have firmly protected the legislative mandate of
at will employment 3 and summarily foreclosed any argument that the
covenant would mitigate this doctrine.94
Hawaii
In the well-known and often-cited decision of Parnar v. Americana
Hotels, Inc., 5 the Hawaii Supreme Court created a public policy tort and
declined to recognize the covenant in the employment context. 6 In one brief
paragraph the court acknowledged the recent trend which reins in the
86. Id. at 102.
87. Id. at 103.
88. Id.
89. Kelly v. Gill, 544 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1029 (1990). The court noted that this rule would be qualified if a statute granted a specific
property right. Id.
90. Catania v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
91. Paddock v. Bay Concrete Indus., Inc., 154 So. 2d 313, 316-17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963). This is reminiscent of Lady Duff-Gordon's situation. See supra text accompanying
Article notes 7-8.
92. E.H. Crump of Florida, Inc. v. Aikin, 571 So. 2d 1353, 1354, 119 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
56,691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
93. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-7-1 (Harrison 1990).
94. Id.; Gunn v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 291 S.E.2d 779, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4203 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1982).
95. 652 P.2d 625, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4817 (Haw. 1982).
96. Id. at 629-31.
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employer's power of discharge, but rejected the covenant as the proper means
to do so:
[T]o imply into each employment contract a duty to terminate in good faith
would seem to subject each discharge to judicial incursions into the
amorphous concept of bad faith. We are not persuaded that protection of
employees requires such an intrusion on the employment relationship or
such an imposition on the courts.
97
Idaho
The Supreme Court of Idaho has recognized and defined the covenant in
every employment contract. In Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co.,98 the
court declared that an action for breach of the covenant sounds in contract.99
The thrust of the covenant is to protect the parties' benefits in their employ-
ment contracts: "[A]ny action which violates, nullifies or significantly impairs
any benefit or right which either party has in an employment contract, whether
express or implied, is a violation of the covenant."' 00 This puts Idaho in
line with Arizona.' 0'
The facts in Metcalf provide one of the clearest examples0 of the
value of the covenant so described. A woman was promised and paid sick
leave benefits, but then she was fired for being sick. Thus, she had no breach
of contract action, but the benefit of the sick leave pay was nullified by the
fact that she was fired for collecting it.
97. Id. at 629.
98. 778 P.2d 744, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 961, 113 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,136
(Idaho 1989).
99. Id. at 748-49. Idaho allows front pay and punitive damages in breach of contract suits.
O'Dell v. Basabe, 810 P.2d 1082, 1101 (Idaho 1991).
100. Metcalf, 778 P.2d at 749.
101. Id. Metcalf relies a great deal on Wagenseller. Id. at 746-50. See supra text
accompanying note 26.
102. See supra text accompanying Article notes 87-92.
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Illinois
Illinois has refused to recognize the covenant as a source of a private
action,"3 but the covenant aids in interpreting contractual language."
The covenant also played a role in a class action suit seeking adjudication of
severance pay benefits.'0 5 The issue was which of two severance pay
policies should apply. The earlier, more generous policy had been declared
"rescinded" by a later policy. Two weeks after the later policy was issued, the
company began laying off large numbers of employees. The employees
claimed that the benefits from the earlier policy were vested. The court held
that the earlier policy applied primarily because of promissory estoppel, but
also cited commission cases0 6 and other covenant cases.'0 7
Indiana
Appellate courts in Indiana have declared that employers owe no duty of
good faith and fair dealing to at will employees."' The courts do not
engage in much discourse explaining their position. A quote from Corbin
indicates some concem over lack of mutuality,0 9 and subsequent language
indicates that the employer "must be accorded wide latitude in determining
whom it will employ and retain in employment."" 0
103. Foy v. City of Chicago, 551 N.E.2d 310 (ill. App. Ct. 1990); Criscione v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 384 N.E.2d 91, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4224 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). In Criscione
the court makes clear that an action may lie for bad faith breach of an employment contract, but
not "simply for a bad faith dismissal of an employee at will." Id. at 94. At any rate the
dismissal in that case was found to have been for poor performance. Id. See generally Joanne
Sokachitich, Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Illinois: An Application in the Employment
Contract, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 183.
104. Harrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 546 N.E.2d 248, 256, 115 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
56,311 (ll. App. Ct. 1989); Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 440 N.E.2d 998, 1005, 115
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4524 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). For a thorough discussion of Illinois common law
on employment, see Sokachitich, supra note 103.
105. Kulins v. Malco, Inc., 459 N.E.2d 1038, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2575 (ll. Ct. App.
1984).
106. Id. at 1044 (citing Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 115
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4658 (Mass. 1977)).
107. Kulins, 459 N.E.2d at 1045.
108. Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1061, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4417 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1980).
109. Id. at 1061-62 (quoting Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th
Cir. 1976)).
110. Hamblen v. Danners, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 926, 929, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3470 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1985). See also Campbell, 413 N.E.2d 1054 (example of restrictive language). Even the
concurring opinion in Campbell, which would have further extended the public policy exception,
rejected implication of the covenant into the employment relationship. Id. at 106. (Ratliff, J.,




In Fogel v. Trustees of Iowa College,"' the Iowa Supreme Court
expressly avoided deciding whether to apply the covenant in the employment
context."' Since then, the court has used that avoidance as precedent for
declaring that the covenant has not been recognized in the state."
Kansas
In the carefully researched opinion of Morriss v. Coleman Co.,' the
Kansas Supreme Court rejected the covenant in employment at will situa-
tions." 5 The opinion acknowledged that the legislature had adopted the
UCC which imposes a duty of good faith in commercial transactions and that
the court itself had imposed the duty in construction cases." 6 Nonetheless,
the majority wrote:
After a careful consideration of these various cases, pro and con, the
majority of the court has concluded that the principle of law stated in
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, that every contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement, is overly broad and should not be applicable to employment-
at-will c,ntracts.1
7
This conclusion was not reached without objection. Justice Herd thought that
the Restatement's duty should be adopted in the workplace.
Employment contracts are the most sensitive of all contracts, They
determine the standard of living and the quality of education for children,
and affect the general welfare of all the people in this country. It is
ludicrous that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been adopted
pertaining to commercial transactions (see K.S.A. 84-1-203) but has not
been adopted for transactions involving human working conditions."
8
Justice Herd then discussed the unequal bargaining positions of employers and
employees and pointed out that the at will doctrine is not absolute, citing
various laws enacted to balance out the unequal bargaining positions." 9
Justice Herd's opinion gave him an opportunity to define bad faith: a
termination which has "nothing to do with the worker's job performance or
111. 446 N.W.2d 451, 6 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 313, 317-18, 117 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
56,454 (Iowa 1989).
112. Id. at 456-57.
113. Grahek v. Voluntary Hosp. Coop. Ass'n of Iowa, Inc., 473 N.W.2d 31, 34 (Iowa
1991).
114. 738 P.2d 841, 2 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 844, 107 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,825
(Kan. 1987).
115. Id. at 851.
116. Id. at 849-51.
117. Id. at 851.
118. Id. at 851-52 (Herd, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 852.
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the employer's employment needs."'20 The example he gave is a retaliatory
discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim.' He did not recognize
that his example failed to fit his definition. Management's most basic
employment need is for cheap labor. Workers' compensation claimants are
more expensive in both the short and long run; therefore, firing a claimant has
a great deal to do with the employer's bottom-line needs. Perhaps what
Justice Herd considered unfair was firing someone for exercising statutorily
granted and commonly expected rights, 2 other legal doctrines like the
public policy tort and implied-in-fact contract protect such plaintiffs.
Justice Herd would apply the covenant in the case where the employer
"acquiesced in the actions of its supervisory employees in discharging
appellants in retaliation for their off-duty conduct--conduct which apparently
deviated from one supervisor's private code of morality. For the law to
permit such vindictive retaliation is improper and has broad ramifica-
tions."' Such terminations are in bad faith and violate the covenant of fair
dealing. 2
This analysis also falls short of his own definition. The employer needs
to have employees who work well together. If one worker is sufficiently
repelled by another, something must be changed. It is standard practice for
employer to favor and retain more senior and higher echelon employees over
underlings.
Kentucky
In Grzyb v. Evans,'25 the Kentucky Supreme Court dismissed a cove-
nant claim without much comment. 26 An appellate court in another case
made the following statement:
The issue here is one of public policy which is first and foremost a matter
for legislative determination. The legislature has not seen fit to establish
any policy in this area, and we are not convinced that this is a proper area
for the exercise of judicial activism. 27
120. Id. See supra text accompanying Article notes 109-23.
121. Morriss, 738 P.2d at 852 (Herd, J., concurring).
122. In fact protection of workers' compensation claimants came one year later when the
public policy tort was created in Chrismanv. Philips Industries, Inc., 751 P.2d 140, 3 Ind. Emp.
Rights Cas. (BNA) 181 (Kan. 1988).
123. Morriss, 738 P.2d at 852 (Herd, J., concurring). A married but separated male
employee and a single female employee took a trip together. She took a day off work for it.
Id. at 843-45. Thbere is evidence in the record ... that [the supervisor] had strong religious
beliefs and values ... and that he terminated plaintiffs simply because he disapproved of their
taking a trip together without being married." Id. at 845. They were otherwise excellent
employees. Id. at 842-43.
124. Id.
125. 700 SAV.2d 399, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1125, 103 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,538,
115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4769 (Ky. 1985).
126. Id. at 400-01.
127. Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811, 812, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4769 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1977).
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Louisiana
While not using "covenant" language, one Louisiana court has stated in
dicta that employment terminations may not be arbitrary and capricious.'
According to the court, this protection from unjust discharge has its origins in
the Louisiana Civil Code which provides protection for those applying for
workers' compensation and for those working under a fixed term:
If, without any serious ground of complaint, a man should send away a
laborer whose services he has hired for a certain time, before that time has
expired, he shall be bound to pay to such laborer the whole of the salaries




The Maine Supreme Court has refused to find the covenant implied in
law.'3 ' The court has declined to usurp the tasks of the legislative
branch' and has expressed its dislike for overriding the at will presumption
without clear statements of the parties' intent to do so.'
Maryland
Maryland has apparently refused to recognize a cause of action on the
covenant, choosing instead to include such causes of action in tort suits
brought for termination in contravention of public policy.'33
128. Wiley v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 430 So. 2d 1016, 1020, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 5170 (La.
Ct. App. 1982). Wiley involved a fixed term employee, but in dictum the court wrote: 'This
court has heretofore recognized, in other contexts, that a contract terminable at will is
nevertheless subject to limitation on the exercise of that will, to wit: that such termination not
be arbitrary and capricious." Id. At that point the Wiley court cited Gautreau v. Southern Farm
Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., 410 So. 2d 815 (La. Ct. App.), writ granted, 414 So. 2d 392
(La. 1982), rev'd, 429 So. 2d 866 (La. 1983). Gautreau involved an alleged bad faith failure
to renew an insurance policy.
129. LA. CIV. CODE' ANN. art. 2749 (West 1952), quoted in Wiley, 430 So. 2d at 1021
(emphasis added). Of course this is a codification of the standard common law rule that
employment for a specified term is not terminable at will, but rather is terminable only for cause.
The Wiley court perhaps sought to soften the edges of history, for it continued: "the article's
humane purpose of preventing abusive discharge has at times been thwarted by a narrow, limited
construction of the term 'hired for a certain time."' Wiley, 430 So. 2d at 1021.
130. Bard v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 590 A.2d 152, 156, 6 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA)
721, 121 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,884 (Me. 1991).
131. Poirier v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2086, 2087 (Me. 1983).
132. Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 97, 99-100, 104 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
55,577, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2489 (Me. 1984).
133. See generally Vasques v. National Geographic Soc'y, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4181 (D.
Md. 1982); Beye v. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 477 A.2d 1197, 1200-01, 2 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas,
(BNA) 1893 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 84 A.2d 274 (Md. 1984).
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Massachusetts
Massachusetts is the home of the seminal case of Fortune v. National
Cash Register Co., 34 which provides the textbook example of an "I know
it when I see it" breach of the covenant by an employer who takes advantage
of a commission salesman.'35 Plaintiff was a cash register salesman,
terminable at will. A contract provided that plaintiff would receive a weekly
salary plus a bonus for sales made within his sales territory. The amount of
bonus was to be determined on the basis of bonus credits. The key to the case
is that bonus credits turned on which territory the salesman was working in.
The salesman would receive a seventy-five percent bonus if the territory was
assigned to him at the date of the order, twenty-five percent if the territory
was assigned to him at the date of delivery and installation, or 100% if the
territory was assigned to him at both times.
Plaintiff made a superlative sale of 2,008 cash registers for a purchase
price of $5 million. His bonus credit should have been $92,079.99. The deal
closed November 29, 1968. On January 6, 1969, plaintiff found a termination
notice addressed to his home dated December 2, 1968. Although the notice
officially fired him, it also told him to "stay on" and "[k]eep on doing what
[he was] doing right [then].' 36  He collected seventy-five percent of his
bonus. The remaining twenty-five percent was paid to some other salesman,
contrary to the company's own policy. Eighteen months after the termination
notice, plaintiff asked to retire and was finally fired in June 1970. The
company had paid him all it was obliged -to under the expressly at will
commission contract described above.
The highest state court held that while it was legitimate for an employer
to be motivated by its own legitimate business interests, and while an
employer was entitled to wide latitude in deciding whom to employ, the
employer must act with good faith.' The statement of the rule of the case
is fairly narrow, for the court shied away from the broad assertion'38 that the
covenant attaches to every employment contract:
It is clear, however, that, on the facts before us, a finding is warranted that
a breach of the contract occurred. Where the principal seeks to deprive the
agent of all compensation by terminating the contractual relationship when
the agent is on the brink of successfully completing the sale, the principal
has acted in bad faith and the ensuing transaction between the principal and
the buyer is to be regarded as having been accomplished by the agent. The
same result obtains where the principal attempts to deprive the agent of any
portion of a commission due the agent.1
3 9
134. 364 N.E.2d 1251, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4658 (Mass. 1977). See supra text
accompanying Article notes 59-63.
135. Fortune, 364 N.E.2d at 1253-55. See text accompanying Article notes 74-75.
136. Fortune, 364 N.E.2d at 1254.
137. Id. at 1257.
138. The court read New Hampshire's Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549,552, 115
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4755 (N.H. 1974), to embrace the idea that every employment contract carries
the covenant with it, and declined to go as far as its sister state. Fortune, 364 N.E.2d at 1257.
139. Fortune, 364 N.E.2d at 1257 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGEN6Y § 454 &
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Subsequent Massachusetts courts have attempted to articulate breach of
the covenant. Mere absence of good cause to discharge does not give rise to
a breach of the covenant, unless the employee can show that the discharge
involved an intent by the employer to benefit financially at the employee's
expense or that the employer's reason was contrary to public policy. 4
Terminations which are "bad, unjust, and unkind," without good cause, and
contrary to the employee's expectations do not give rise to a cause of
action.'4 ' Otherwise, a "new practical definition [would] be given to
employments theoretically terminable at will."'42 In an important limitation
on Fortune, the court held that the covenant is not breached if the employee
is dej~rived merely of "future compensation for future services ... not
'specifically related to a particular past service."" 43
Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co.,' decided in 1982, shed some light on what
constitutes actionable bad faith. 4 ' The employer had given a pretextual
reason for firing three workers, charging them with poor work performance
when the real reason for termination was their refusal to answer a question-
naire asking about such personal information as "business experience,
education, family, home ownership, physical data, activities and aims" and
medical histories including "serious illnesses, operations accidents, or nervous
disorders, [ ] smoking and drinking habits, [ ] off-the-job problems, [ ]
principal worries."' The court declined to find liability for breach of the
covenant.
We decline to impose liability on an employer simply because it gave a
false reason or a pretext for the discharge of an employee at will. Such an
employer has no duty to give any reason at the time of discharging an
employee at will. Where no reason need be given, we impose no liability
on a employer for concealing the real reason for an employee's discharge
or for giving a reason that is factually insupportable. As a kindness to an
employee in his seeking future employment, an employer may well not state
its reasons fully and accurately. Here, of course, [the employer's] motiva-
tion may not have been so noble. We conclude, however, that an at will
employee discharged without cause does not have a claim for damages
simply because the employer gave him a false reason for his discharge.
cmt. a (1958)).
140. Siles v. Travenol Lab. Inc., 433 N.E.2d 103, 106, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4178 (Mass.
App. CL 1982).
141. Richey v. American Auto. Ass'n, Inc., 406 N.E.2d 675, 678 (Mass. 1980).
142. Id.
143. Cataldo v. Zuckerman, 482 N.E.2d 849, 855 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (quoting McCone
v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 471 N.E.2d 47, 50, 102 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,488, 118 L,R.R.M.
(BNA) 2406 (Mass. 1984), and discussing Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 461 N.E.2d 796, 798,
118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2401 (Mass. 1984)).
144. 431 N.E.2d 908, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 5127 (Mass. 1982).
145. Id. See supra note 74.
146. Cort, 431 N.E.2d at 913.
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The balance of public policy considerations does not support the allowance
of recovery of damages in such a case. 147
The court's conclusion that the employer did not violate public policy by
discharging a worker for the incompleteness of his responses to a question-
naire is at least partially explained by its factual determination that this
particular questionnaire was not so intrusive as to be unreasonable. 14' The
reader of the Cort decision can extrapolate that the court was more concerned
with scrutinizing motivation for firing than the manner of the firing. The
court seems to ignore the "fair dealing" aspect of the covenant.
To summarize, 49 Massachusetts finds breach of the covenant when
there has been a deprivation of benefits attributable to past services or a
serious breach of public policy. 5°
Michigan
No cause of action will lie in this state for breach of the covenant,'
even in the Fortune-type situation of a commission salesman." 2 "In
147. Id. at 911. The court went on: "[tihe fact that whatever reason was given by the
employer was false might, however, be relevant if the employer was attempting to conceal the
real reason for the discharge and the real reason was contrary to public policy." Id. at 911 n.6.
148. Id. at 913. The court explained:
In public policy terms, it is the degree of intrusion on the rights of the employee
which is most important. In measuring the nature of the intrusion, at least as to its
reasonableness (but perhaps as vell as to its substantiality and seriousness), the
nature of the employee's job is of some significance. The information that a high
level or confidential employee should reasonably be expected to disclose is broader
in scope and more personal in nature than that which should be expected from an
employee who mows grass or empties waste baskets. A salesman responsible for the
sale of drug products to hospitals, doctors, and pharmacists falls in the middle of this
range, but toward its upper side. The temperament and dedication of a salesman are
important factors in his effectiveness, and questions bearing on these subjects are
certainly reasonable and should be expected.
Id.
149. For an excellent summary of pivotal Massachusetts law, see Magnan v. Anaconda
Industries Inc., 479 A.2d 781, 787-88, 101 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,485, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2163 (Conn. 1984).
150. In Massachusetts the public policy cause of action sounds in contract, and is predicated
on breach of the covenant. Mello v. Stop & Shop Cos., 524 N.E.2d 105, 3 Ind. Emp. Rights
Cas. (BNA) 1105, 122 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,932 (Mass. 1988). In other words, breach of
public policy cases are a subset of breach of the covenant cases. Glaz v. Ralston Purina Co., 509
N.E.2d 297, 299, 2 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 497 (Mass. App. Ct.), review denied, 513
N.E.2d 1289 (Mass. 1987) (citing DeRose v. Putnam Management Co., 496 N.E.2d 428, 1 Ind.
Emp. Rights Cas (BNA) 1672, J05 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,659 (Mass. 1986)).
151. Otis v. Zayre Corp., 703 F. Supp. 634, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 33, 123 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) 57,106 (W.D. Mich. 1988), affid, 884 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1989).
152. Cockels v. International Bus. Expositions, Inc., 406 N.W.2d 465, 468, 3 Ind. Emp.
Rights Cas. (BNA) 764 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). The employee was found to have another avenue
of recovery, namely wrongful discharge in violation of public policy as embodied in the state
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Michigan, an employer may terminate an employee arbitrarily and capriciously
absent a violation of public policy or an agreement to the contrary."'
53
Minnesota
In Hunt v. IBM Mid-America Employees Federal Credit Union,15 4 the
Minnesota Supreme Court refused to recognize an implied-in-law covenant for
the reasons stated by a Hawaii court in Parnar and by a Washington court in
Thompson v. St. Regis. 55  Appellate courts have found implied-in-fact
obligations of good faith. 56 In the years before Hunt rejected the covenant,
appellate courts had made use of it, but its definition was uncertain, Deborah
Schmedemann summarized Minnesota law on the covenant as follows: "bad
faith may be equated with malice, or with lack of good cause, or with ulterior
motives, or with shoddy behavior."' 57
Mississippi
Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.' 8 established that the Mississippi
Supreme Court protects workers by means of the public policy tort rather than
by using the covenant.'59 The concurring judge found appealing an
interpretation of the covenant whereby "an employee's longevity of service
might give rise to an implied right beyond mere terminable at will status," but
the judge hesitated to change the status quo before reviewing financial data. 6
Missouri
In Neighbors v. Kirksville College' Missouri rejected use of the
covenant to "circumvent" at will status.'62 A federal court, interpreting
Missouri law, best explained the common law of Missouri:
Regarding Count III, alleging a violation of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing, insofar as this is asserted to be a qualification on all employment
relationships, limiting the harshness of the "at will" doctrine, this is clearly
inconsistent with the recent vigorous reaffirmation of the "at will" doctrine.
Wages and Fringe Benefits Act. Id. at 467.
153. Id. at 468.
154. 384 N.W.2d 853, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1087, 104 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
55,556, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2627 (Minn. 1986).
155. Id. at 858. For a discussion of Parnar, see supra text accompanying notes 95-97 and
for discussion of Thompson see infra text accompanying notes 266-69.
156. Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas.
(BNA) 1092 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). See generally Deborah A. Schmedmann, Working
Backwards: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Employment Law, 16 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 1119 (1990).
157. Schmedmann, supra note 156, at 1129 (emphasis added).
158. 508 So. 2d 1086,2 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 805, 107 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,812
(Miss. 1987).
159. Id. at 1089.
160. Id. at 1090 (Robertson, J., concurring).
161. 694 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
162. Id. at 824.
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It was there ruled that the doctrine could not be avoided by the "cloaking"
of claims in the "misty shroud of prima facie tort." It would be equally
forbidden, surely, to rule that the termination of all at will employment
must occur in a manner that a trier of fact would say was consistent with
"good faith and fair dealing." The Missouri courts have rejected such a
contention. 63
In contrast to this sound reaffirmation of the at will doctrine, or perhaps
in mitigation thereof, Missouri statutory law requires that under certain
circumstances a corporate employer must, upon written request from a former
employee, send the employee a letter explaining why the employment
relationship was terminated."6 This rule amounts to a statutory "fair
dealing" requirement.
Finally, insofar as an express or implied-in-fact contract exists, the
covenant has been implied to prevent circumvention of contractual terms.
Montana
The eyes of the country have turned to Montana because it was the
first-and so far the only-state to enact a wrongful discharge statute. The
legislation codifies a rule that, after a probationary period, good cause must
be shown for termination. Relief sounds in contract. Nonetheless, for the
purposes of this Article, it is instructive to review some of the earlier covenant
cases which provided the catalyst for the legislature to enact clearer rules. 6"
The Montana courts in the early 1980s were concerned with employee
reliance on employer assurances" and were willing to impose the covenant
into the employment relationship. It was unclear whether the covenant was
implied in law67 or in fact.
68
163. Fink v. Revco Discount Drug Ctrs., Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1325, 1328-29, 3 Ind. Emp.
Rights Cas. (BNA) 115, 108 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,876 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (citations omitted).
164. Mo. REv. STAT. § 290.140 (1986). The letter must be written if the employer has
seven or more employees, if the employee was employed for at least 90 days, and if the
employee makes a written request for the letter. The letter must be signed by the superintendent
or manager, and must set forth "the nature and character of service rendered by such employee
to such corporation and the duration thereof, and truly stating for what cause, if any, such
employee was discharged or voluntarily quit such service." Id.
165. The legislature sought to throw a bone to both workers and management by enacting
the good cause requirement but limiting damages. The statute applies to situations where the
employee received notice of termination after the effective date of the statute. Martin v. Special
Resource Management, Inc., 803 P.2d 1086, 1089, 6 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 440 (Mont.
1990).
166. See, e.g., Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1067, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2071 (Mont. 1982). The employer had promulgated a handbook, which "presumably sought to
secure an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force by establishing uniform policies. The
employee, having faith that she would be treated fairly, then developed the peace of mind
associated with job security. If the employer has failed to follow its own policies, the peace of
mind of its employees is shattered and an injustice is done." Id.
167. In Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co., 668 P.2d 213, 214, 98 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
55,399, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4350 (Mont. 1983), the court held that the covenant existed
"apart from, and in addition to, any terms agreed to by the parties."
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Montana precedent best falls in the line with the implied-in-fact contract
cases, despite the courts' continued use of the phrase "covenant of good faith
and fair dealing."'69 Apparently, the court originally used this language to
avoid the appearance of "amending" the then-existing at will statute,170 even
though one justice on the Montana Supreme Court found no tension between
good faith and at will. To reconcile the two, this same justice cautioned
against going too far in equating good faith with good cause in Dare v.
Montana Petroleum Marketing Co.:171
[T]he [good faith] obligation recognized by this Court must be reconciled
with the "at will" statute. I think this can easily be done. An employer,
under the "at will" statute, has the right to terminate. However if the
employer violates the legal obligation to treat the employee fairly and in
good faith, then a separate and independent tort action can be instituted by
the injured employee against the offending employer. Damages, not
reinstatement, is the remedy.
We are treading on thin ice as we attempt to construct new protections
for employees. There is an indication in the majority opinion that the
plaintiff can only be terminated "for cause." Such a determination certainly
conflicts with the "at will" statute. We must not confuse the "term of
employment" with the right of the employee to be dealt with fairly and in
good faith.'
72
The Dare majority certainly implied that the covenant basically
guaranteed that the employee could be terminated only for cause. Two
168. In Dare v. Montana Petroleum Marketing Co., 687 P.2d 1015, 1020, 104 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) 55,596, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2442 (Mont. 1984), the court wrote:
Whether a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in a particular case
depends upon objective manifestations by the employer giving rise to the employee's
reasonable belief that he or she has job security and will be treated fairly. The
presence of such facts indicates that the term of employment has gone beyond the
indefinite period contemplated in the at will employment statute, section 39-2-503,
MCA, and is founded upon some more secure and objective basis. In such cases,
the implied covenant protects the investment of the employee who in good faith
accepts and maintains employment reasonably believing their [sic] job is secure so
long as they perform their duties satisfactorily. Such an employee is protected from
bad faith or unfair treatment by the employer to which the employee may be subject
due to the inherent inequality of bargaining power present in many employment
relationships. The implied covenant seeks to strike a balance between the interest
of the employer in controlling the work force and the interests of the employee in
job security.
(citation omitted).
169. See, e.g., Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 693 P.2d 487, 491, 104 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) 55,590, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2075 (Mont. 1984).
170. Dare, 687 P.2d at 1021 (Morrison, J., specially concurring).
171. 687 P.2d 1015, 104 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,596, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2442 (Mont.
1984).
172. Id. at 1021-22 (Morrison, J., specially concurring).
173. Id. at 1020.
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years later the Montana Supreme court again attempted to define the covenant
in Flanigan v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n,:-
The covenant, in a long-term employment situation, only requires the
employer to have a fair and honest reason for termination. An employee's
incompetence or lack of loyalty certainly constitute sufficient reasons under
this standard. However, as in this case, an employer may recognize by
companypolicy an obligation to provide warnings and an opportunity for
change.
The facts of Flanigan demonstrate the petty complexity of workplace
relations and highlight the difficulty of pinpointing what behavior amounts to
violation of the covenant. Plaintiff, a twenty-eight-year employee, was
terminated. The first reason given was that the. employer was obliged to
undertake a reduction in force because of economic downturns. Other reasons
for her termination came from her superior, Ogolin. Ogolin asserted that
plaintiff performed poorly, but admitted that plaintiff "was never warned,
reprimanded or counseled about her performance." 176 Ogolin had testified
that plaintiff was marked for termination before she was transferred to another
city and underwent a teller training program, but that testimony was later
recanted. Plaintiff alleged that the discharge was motivated by Ogolin's
vindictiveness because her seniority allowed her to have better vacation time
than his. Plaintiff further implied that she was terminated because of her age
and because the employer wanted to cut pension costs.
Students of this case may be puzzled over exactly why the jury found the
employer had breached the covenant in this case-because Ogolin told
conflicting stories to plaintiff and to the court, because the court believed that
Ogolin was vindictive, because the court believed that the company was an
ageist and impermissibly money-grubbing, or because of totality of the cir-
cumstances? Perhaps a line buried in the supreme court opinion is most
telling. The court wrote: "A long-term employee has an expectation of
continued employment provided that the employee's work performance is
satisfactory."'77  In other words, the covenant for long-term employees
amounted to ajust cause requirement. The high stakes in Flanigan-affirmed
damages added up to $1,494.170 7 -- explain the desire in the state legisla-
ture to clear up the confusion left by the case as to the rule of law.
174. 720 P.2d 257, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1410, 104 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,589,
122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2597 (Mont.), appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 980 (1986).
175. Id. at 262.
176. Id. at 261.
177. Id. (citing Dare, 687 P.2d at 1020).
178. Id. at 258. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff awarding economic damages of
$94,170, emotional distress damages of $100,000 and punitive damages of $1,300,000. Three





Jeffers v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hospital1 79 reaffirmed that the
Nebraska courts have remained wedded to at will "except in those cases where
employees are deprived of constitutional or statutory rights or where
contractual agreements guarantee that employees may not be fired without
'just cause."" 8°  According to dictum in a non-employment case, if an
employment contract requires good cause for termination, the covenant is
implicated.''
Nevada
Nevada's case law is somewhat inconsistent, but apparently this state is
alone in recognizing tort liability for bad faith in the employment context. In
the 1987 case of K-Mart Corp. v. Ponsock,"' the court recognized tortious
discharge in violation of the covenant. Plaintiffs, K-Mart employees, had
"tenured" positions, but the employer fired them to circumvent contractual
retirement benefits. The court stated that breach of a "good cause" contract
is not a tort, but if the jury finds malice and oppression on the part of the
employer, the employer may be liable for the tort of bad faith.'83 The
court's bad faith holding recognizes the workers' significantly lower
bargaining power; tort liability may only have been intended when a mega-
corporation is the defendant. The court stated: "[W]e now recognize a bad
faith discharge case in this fact-specific instance of discharge by a large,
nationwide employer of an employee in bad faith for the improper motive of
defeating contractual retirement benefits."'8 4
While the K-Mart court correctly identified some of the problems that
workers face and engineered a result that may well be laudable from a social
179. 387 N.W.2d 692, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 621,105 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,651
(Neb. 1986).
180. Id. at 695 (citing Alford v. Life Savers, Inc., 315 N.W.2d 260, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
4066 (Neb. 1982)).
181. Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769, 774 (Neb. 1991).
182. 732 P.2d 1364, 2 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 56, 106 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,683
(Nev. 1987).
183. Id. at 1368 n.3.
184. Id. at 1370. The main reason for tort liability, according to the court, is to "protect
the weak from the insults of the stronger." Id. at 1376. The court went on:
The reality of [plaintiff's] dependency and economic vulnerability is high-lighted by
the following expression taken from F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9
(1951):
We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for
our means of livelihood, and most of our people have become completely dependent
upon wages. If they-lose their jobs they lose every resource except for the relief
supplied by the various forms of social security. Such dependence of the mass of
the people upon others for all of their income is something new in the world. For
our generation, the substance of life is in another man's hands.
Id. at 1372.
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perspective,' the opinion failed to differentiate between legal theories.
Liability turns on a "malice/oppression" finding, which harkens to punitive
damage requirements;" 6 however, the court allowed the award of punitive
damages on top of the tort damages. What additional finding was required?
Also, the court evidently misunderstood the at will doctrine, for it blithely
wrote that its creation of the public policy tort (and, presumably, the covenant
action) did not erode the at will doctrine." 7 The court apparently forgot that
at will means that a person can be fired for good reason, for no reason, or
even for bad reason.
Two years later the court was confronted with casino employees who had
no express contract and certainly no tenure agreement. In Sands Regent v.
Valgardson,'88 the plaintiff employees were terminated allegedly for being
too old. They sought tort and punitive damages in addition to state and
federal age discrimination recovery. The court distinguished the K-Mart case
because here there was no contract. The court also found that age-based firing
did not compel tort recovery because it was not in violation of a sufficiently
strong and compelling public policy.'89
Recently the Nevada Supreme Court has explained more about its
conception of the covenant. In early 1991, the court again attempted to "set
the record straight" on the availability of the bad faith tort.90 The tort is
only recognized when a contractual right to continued employment exists.
The tort provides a remedy designed to be "accessory" to contract remedies,
used to "fill gaps and do justice where the terms of a contract are literally
carried out, but the spirit of the agreement and the intentions of the parties are
not."' 9' The court wrote:
185. For language approving the result in K-Mart, see Noye v. Hoffinann-LaRoche, Inc.,
570 A.2d 12, 5 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 352, 115 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,273 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div.) (Stein, J., concurring), cert. denied, 584 A.2d 218 (N.J. 1990). Judge Stein
candidly writes, "I am not sure that my colleagues and I would have been content to let this [K-
Mart] plaintiff recover the obviously inadequate damages available as a contract remedy, given
the conduct of this employer." Id. at 19.
186. In Nevada exemplary and punitive damages are allowed upon a finding of"oppression,
fraud or malice, express or implied." NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42.005(1) (Michie 1991)..
187. K-Mart, 732 P.2d at 1396. The court wrote:
The public policy torts in general and the tort of retaliatory discharge in particular
cannot be seen as erosions of the so-called at-will doctrine. An employer still has
in the typical at will employment situation the absolute right to dismiss an employee
at-will or at-whim; the employer just cannot do-so for reasons which offend public
policy, such as the rightful filing of an industrial insurance claim. Of course, the
plaintiff in this case was not at will because of his tenure arrangement.
Id.
188. 777 P.2d 898, 5 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 381 (Nev. 1989).
189. Id. at 900. This language was called into question by D'Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d
206, 217 n.10, 123 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 57,099 (Nev. 1991) (Steffen, J., dissenting).
190. Western States Minerals Corp. v. Jones, No. 19697, slip op. (Nev. Mar. 7, 1991). This
bad faith tort was distinguished from tortious discharge in violation of public policy. Id. at 2-3.
191. Id. at 11.
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The essence of the bad faith tort action is betrayal; and, when a high degree
of trust and reliance between a stronger and a weaker party is violated, tort
liability may be incurred. Two elements of the tort must, however, be
established by the offended party: 1) a relationship involving a high degree
of trust, reliance and dependency, and 2) an act of bad faith and betrayal
by the trusted party. Mere breach of an employment contract does not give
rise to tort damages. 92
The court cited K-Mart and then articulated some of the factors which
"might bear on the degree of fiduciary reliance and cohesiveness in the
employer-employee relationship," including longevity of employment; "age,
health, employability of the employee and other incidents that bear on relative
dependency of an employee and vulnerability in the event of wrongful
discharge;" employee reliance and expectancy that employment "will continue
indefinitely based on good conduct and sound performance," as evidenced by
changing residences or going into debt; employer's financial strength; and
employer's knowledge of the employee's reliance and dependency.' 9' Later
the court stressed that plaintiff must establish contractual rights. "[B]y its
nature this kind of employer-employee relationship cannot develop in an at-
will employment." 94
The court found that plaintiffs relationship with the employer in
D'Angelo had not sufficiently "ripened" to justify recovery in tort. "[Plaintiff]
was a relatively young man, forty-one, who, as a truck driver, had consider-
ably more occupational 'bargaining strength and marketability' than did [the
K-Mart plaintiff].'95
A month later, in Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Butch Lewis Productions,96
the court took its most limited position on the covenant:
Where the terms of a contract are literally complied with but one party to
the contract deliberately contravenes the intention and spirit of the contract,
that party can incur liability -for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
197
The tort remedy is necessarily a narrow one found, for example, in
insurance cases and certain highly restricted wrongful discharge cases.
198
When one party performs a contract in a manner that is unfaithful to the
purpose of the contract and the justified expectations of the other party are
thus denied, damages may be awarded against the party who does not act
in good faith.199
192. Id. at 17.
193. Id. at 18-20.
194. Id. at 2.
195. Id. at 21.
196. 808 P.2d 919 (Nev. 1991).
197. Id. at 922-23.
198. Id. at 923 n.4 (citations omitted).
199. Id. at 923.
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To conclude, Nevada departs from other states by allowing an action on
the covenant to sound in tort and by stressing the psychological and financial
vulnerability of the plaintiff. The Nevada court is more moralistic in its
language than others, like the Arizona court in Wagenseller" But Nevada
is somewhat in line with those states which recognize a covenant only when
other express or implied contractual terms are being circumvented and not
when the relationship is at will.2"' Still, after emphasizing the plight of
unprotected workers facing down monolithic employers, the Nevada court
exposes itself to criticism when it distinguishes between contractually
protected employees and at will employees. By allowing tort recovery to the
former and nothing to the latter, the court gives the most to the workers who
were already sufficiently able to protect themselves as to obtain a contract and
leaves the unempowered worker at the mercy of the employer.
New Hampshire
New Hampshire is the home of the Monge02 case, one of the first cases
in the nation to limit the at will doctrine. In 1974 the New Hampshire court
acknowledged that the employer "has long ruled the workplace with an iron
hand by reason of the prevailing [at will] rule."2 3  In keeping with a
growing modernization of the state law,2" the court unabashedly altered the
at will rules in New Hampshire. Noting the public interest in maintaining a
proper balance between the employer's interest in running business and the
employee's interest in maintaining employment, the court wrote: "We hold
that a termination by the employer of a contract of employment at will which
is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not in the best
interest of the economic system or the public good and constitutes a breach of
the employment contract."2 The gravamen of the tort turned on malice.
Although subsequent dicta from the New Hampshire Supreme Court
limited Monge to situations where the employer violated public policy,06
more recent pronouncements of the court made clear that the employment tort
is a hybrid. Plaintiffs must meet a two-part test involving both bad faith and
violations of public policy.0 7
200. For a discussion of Wagenseller, see supra text accompanying notes 22-28.
201. This was recently reaffirmed in D'Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206, 6 Ind. Emp.
Rights Cas. (BNA) 1545, 123 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 57,099 (Nev. 1991).
202. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4755 (N.H. 1974).
203. Id. at 551.
204. The court cited recent changes in "ancient feudal" landlord/tenant rules. Id. at 551.
205. Id.
206. Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273, 1274, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4578 (N.H.
1980).
207. Vandegrift v. American Brands Corp., 572 F. Supp. 496, 498, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2317 (D.N.H. 1983) (citing Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 96 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) 55,378, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4329 (N.H. 1981)). Various courts make the overboard
statement that New Hampshire has abandoned the covenant. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data





The general rule in New Jersey is that no covenant will be read into the
at will employment relationship.. with one exceptioj: 20 9 If an employer has
terminated an employee in order to avoid payment of vested commissions, an
action on the covenant will lie. The remedy is only payment of those
commissions, not "all the commissions the worker would have earned had he
remained in employment, and certainly not reinstatement of any kind.
Otherwise the jury would be allowed to import "notions of wrongful discharge
into the implied obligation of good faith and thus [impose] upon [the
employer] a generalized duty not to discharge wrongfully, a duty which does
not exist under New York or New Jersey law."2 '
This exception has been extended so that the covenant applies not only
to commission cases but also to "those aspects of the employer-employee
relationship which are governed by some contractual terms, regardless of
whether that relationship is characterized generally as being 'at will."'
2
New Mexico
New Mexico takes the interesting position that "at will" means that a
worker is employed pursuant to a satisfaction contract, which may be
terminated upon the employer's good faith dissatisfaction. Thus, the Wood v.
Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon"' line of cases applies here. No separate cause of
action for tortious breach of the implied covenant will lie.213 According to
a federal court applying New Mexico law, "the New Mexico court considered
208. Noye v. Hoffinan-LaRoche, 570 A.2d 12, 5 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 352, 115
Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,273 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (Stein, J., concurring), cert denied, 584
A.2d 218 (N.J. 1990). The court agreed that a covenant existed in specifically express or
implied-in-fact contracts. The concurrence agreed that the covenant had not been breached in
this case, but thought that tort damages should be available in some cases. After noting that
"[c]oncepts such as good faith and fair dealing are chameleonlike in.character, necessarily
assuming the colorings of the surroundings in which they find themselves," Judge Stein offered
"a definition appropriate to the employer-employee relationship." Id. at 18. Breach of the
covenant should sound in tort when "the employer, without an honest belief that good cause for
discharge in fact exists, attempts to deprive the employee of the benefit of the employment
agreement." Id. Judge Stein sided with Judge Kaufman who concurred in part and dissented in
part to California's Foley. Id. (Stein, J., concurring).
Note that the New Jersey Supreme Court remarked that the public policy tort could be
viewed as "predicated on the breach of an implied provision that an employer will not discharge
an employee for refusing to perform an act that violates a clear mandate of public policy .... "
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 109,
101 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,477, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3044 (N.J. 1980).
209. Wakefield v. Northern Telecom, 769 F.2d 109, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1762,
120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2080 (2d Cir. 1985).
210. 1d. at 114.
211. Nolan v. Control Data Corp., 579 A.2d 1252, 1256, 5 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA)
1570 (N.J Supe'r. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
212. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
213. Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613, 2 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 377 (N.M. Ct. App.
1983), rev'd in part on other grounds, 687 P.2d 1038 (N.M. 1984).
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tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and the tort of wrongful
discharge as two ways of looking at the same thing."2"4
New York
In the leading case of Murphy v. American Home Products Corp.,' 5 the
New York Court of Appeals refused to recognize "a cause of action in tort for
abusive or wrongful discharge of an employee[,] for prima facie tort, or for
breach of contract."2 6 The court demonstrated a firm understanding of the
reasons for modifying the traditional at will rules, but yielded to the legislature
with its "infinitely greater resources and procedural means to discern the
public will, to examine the variety of pertinent considerations, to elicit the
views of the various segments of the community that would be directly
affected and in any event critically interested, and to investigate and anticipate
the impact of imposition of such liability."21 7 The court also declined to
create employment causes of action piecemeal, but suggested that the
legislature address the matter in its totality." 8
Regarding the covenant, the court refused to find that it runs to "all"
contracts. Rather, "New York does recognize that in appropriate circum-
stances an obligation of good faith and fair dealing on the part of a party to
a contract may be implied and, if implied will be enforced ....,,' The
court continued, focusing on the crux of the issue:
No obligation can be implied, however, which would be inconsistent with
other terms of the contractual relationship. Thus, in the case now before
us, plaintiffs employment was at will, a relationship in which the law
accords the employer an unfettered right to terminate the employment at
any time. In the context of such an employment it would be incongruous
to say that an inference may be drawn that the employer impliedly agreed
to a provision which would be destructive of his right of termination.
220
New York does use the covenant to aid and further interpret the express
terms of an employment contract.22'
214. Salazar v. Furr's, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1403, 1409, 2 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 696
(D.N.M. 1986). See also Melnickv. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 1105, 3 Ind. Emp.
Rights Cas. (BNA) 730 (N.M.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 822 (1988).
215. 448 N.E.2d 86,98 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,407, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4953 (N.Y. 1983).
216. Id. at 87.
217. Id. at 89-90.
218. Id. at 92 n.2.
219. Id. at 91 (citing Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917); Pernet
v. Peabody Eng. Corp., 248 N.Y.S.2d 132 (App. Div. 1964)).
220. Id.
221. Id.; Leniger v. Gibbs & Hill, Inc., 730 F.2d 903, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3687 (2d Cir.
1984); Naylor v. CEAG Elec. Corp., 158 A.2d 760 (N.Y App. Div. 1990). The court is fairly
strict on what it considers to be an express contract term. See Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,




In Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co.,222 the North Carolina Su-
preme Court allowed a cause of action for bad faith discharge without basing
the suit on the covenant.' The majority created a new tort of abusive
discharge which prohibits bad faith firing as contrary to public policy.224
The court was able to cite a provision of bad faith discharge of servants dating
back to 1874.5 The court offered no definition of bad faith, leading the
dissent to point out that the majority had "outraced even the California
court" '26 by allowing such a vague and unpredictable standard to muck up
business dealings.
The standard was applied recently by a lower court in a case involving
an employer who was allegedly indifferent to the plaintiff worker's difficulties
in dealing with a belligerent co-worker. 7 Plaintiff ultimately was fired for
hitting the co-worker in self-defense. The appellate court found no bad faith
on the employer's part, and stated, "The conduct of defendants in this case,
in its worst light indifferent and illogical, does not demonstrate the kind of
bad faith that prompted our courts to recognize a cause of action in ...
Coman."28  An action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing exists if the c6ntract is of definite duration.2 9
North Dakota
In Hillesland v. Federal Bank Ass'n of Grand Forks,20 the North
Dakota Supreme Court declined to imply the covenant into at will relation-
ships for the reasons articulated by Hawaii's Parnar case.2"
222. 381 S.E.2d 445, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 987, 113 Lab. Case 56,135 (N.C.
1989).
223. Id. at 448 (citing Haskins v. Royster, 70 N.C. 601 (1874)). One commentator has
stated, 'The bad faith exception to employment-at-will, like the public policy exception, is a
component of a wrongful discharge tort action. Confusion exists in this area because courts often
refer to 'bad faith discharge' as if it were a separate cause of action in tort." Kimberly A.
Huffinan, Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc.: Clarifying the Confusion in North Carolina's
Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 70 N.C. L. REv. 2087, 2088 n.9 (1992).
224. For an attempt to further define the tort, see J. Wilson Parker, North Carolina
Employment After Coman: Reaffirm ingBasic Rights in the Workplace, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
905 (1989).
225. Haskins v. Royster, 70 N.C. 601 (1874).
226. Coman, 381 S.E.2d at 453 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
227. McLaughlin v. Barclay's Am. Co., 382 S.E.2d 836, 840, 113 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
56,148 (N.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 385 S.E.2d 498 (N.C. 1989).
228. Id. at 840. The appellate court went out of its way not to "close [the] doors to
plaintiffs who are able to show bad faith by the employer." Id.
229. Trought v. Richardson, 338 S.E.2d 617, 619, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 750
(N.C. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 344 S.E.2d 18 (N.C. 1986).
230. 407 N.W.2d 206, 2 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 321 (N.D. 1987).
231. Id. For discussion of Parnar, see supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
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Ohio
Ohio has refused to apply the covenant to employment relationships."
The courts have not explained their resistance to the covenant other than to
reaffirm the strong at will rule in Ohio. 23' "At will employees are subject
to termination for cause or no cause, at any time, 'even if done in gross or
reckless disregard of any employee's rights."' 4 In a much earlier commis-
sion case, the Ohio court held that unless fraud or "other unlawfulness" were
present, the court could not save competent people from the deals that they
make. 5
Oklahoma
Burk v. K-Mart Corp.21 6 establishes that the covenant does not apply




In Sheets v. Knight,25 the Oregon Supreme Court established that, in
the absence of an express or implied agreement to limit the at will relation-
ship, no covenant will be imposed in Oregon "because it is not appropriate to
imply the duty if it is inconsistent with a provision of the contract." 9
232. Kuhn v. St. John & W. Shore Hosp., 552 N.E.2d 240, 5 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA)
439 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989). See also Fawcett v. G.C. Murphy & Co., 348 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ohio
1976) ("'Malice makes a bad case worse, but does not make wrong that which is lawful.')
(quoting Johnson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 147 N.W. 32 (Wis. 1914)).
233. Ohio has recognized a public policy tort for discharge in violation of statute. Greeley
v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 981, 5 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA)
257, 115 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,231 (Ohio 1990).
234. Kuhn, 552 N.E.2d at 242 (citing Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 491 N.E.2d 1114,
1116,2 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 786, 104 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,602, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2163 (Ohio 1986), quoting Peterson v. Scott Constr. Co. (1982), 451 N.E.2d 1236, 1239, 115
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4473 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982)). It is interesting that the court refers to "rights"
while denying a remedy.
235. Ullmann v. May, 72 N.E.2d 63, 67 (Ohio 1947).
236. 770 P.2d 24, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 182, 113 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,100
(Okla. 1989).
237. Id. at 24 n.3. An earlier case, Hall v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 713 P.2d 1027,
4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 189, 113 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,099 (Okla. 1985), indicated that
the covenant did apply to an insurance company's termination of a sales agent. That case has
since been limited to agency contracts. Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights
Cas. (BNA) 266, 108 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,849 (Okla. 1987). For a discussion of Parnar, see
supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
238. 779 P.2d 1000, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1196, 115 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,267
(Or. 1989).
239. Id. See also Elliott v. Tektronix, Inc., 796 P.2d 361, 118 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,553
(Or. Ct. App. 1990).
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Pennsylvania
While there is no implied covenant limiting the employer's right to
discharge an at will employee24 and no general duty of fairness in the
employment context,24' some Pennsylvania authority recognizes a cause of
action for "discharge intended specifically to cause harm. 242  Thus, an
action for wrongful discharge may lie wherever an employer's decision to
terminate is motivated by "disinterested malevolence" or by "ulterior pur-
pose."243 The existence of this cause of action has been called into cuestion;
perhaps it is best understood as a category of public policy cases.214 Even
if the cause of action exists, at will plaintiffs seldom recover.245
Rhode Island
Rhode Island is a stalwart bastion of at will.246 The court has stated in
dicta that it is disinclined to alter the legislature's desired at will scheme.247
South Carolina
No case in South Carolina has given serious attention to the covenant,
and none has recognized an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in
employment contracts. 48
240. Galbraith v. Philips Info. Sys., Inc., 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2519 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
241. Butz v. Hertz Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1178, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4044 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
242. Foley v. Presbyterian Ministers' Fund, 749 F. Supp. 109, 5 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas.
(BNA) 1551 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180, 115
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4665 (Pa. 1974).
243. Tourvillev. Inter-Ocean Ins. Co., 508 A.2d 1263 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), appeal denied,
521 A.2d 933 (Pa. 1987). But see Redick v. Kraft, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 296, 5 Ind. Emp. Rights
Cas. (BNA) 1841 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that the only exception to at will is "narrow and
limited circumstances where the discharge violates a significant and recognized public policy")
(citation omitted).
244. McWilliams v. AT & T Info. Sys., Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1186, 1192-94, 5 Ind. Emp.
Rights Cas. (BNA) 295 (W.D. Pa. 1990); Paul v. Lankenau Hosp., 569 A.2d 346, 5 Ind. Emp.
Rights Cas. (BNA) 534, 118 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,569 (Pa. 1990). See Dolores Jacobs Krawec,
Employment-at-Will Rule: The Development of Exceptions and Pennsylvania's Response, 21
DUQ. L. REv. 477 (1983), for a treatment of Geary.
245. See, e.g., Paul, 569 A.2d at 348 (limiting Geary).
246. Blanchette v. Stone, 591 A.2d 785 (R.I. 1991).
247. Salisbury v. Stone, 518 A.2d 1355, 1359 (R.I. 1986). The employee at issue was an
unclassified civil service employee of the state police whose employment was covered by statute.
248. Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359, 1363-64 (D.S.C.
1985) ("It is not surprising that plaintiffs can cite no South Carolina cases which support their
contention in an at will employment context. For the concept of at-will employee/employer
relations, with the attendant right to quit or to fire at any time, for any reason or for no reason
at all, is antithetical to the concept of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.")
(citations omitted); Allan v. Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA)
1453, 116 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,396 (S.C. Ct. C.P. 1989).
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South Dakota
No cause of action on the covenant exists in the general employment
context24 9 for the reasons cited by Kansas' Morriss case,250 namely that the
covenant should not be "transplant[ed] ... into the foreign soil of the




The battle over at will employment in Tennessee has been carried out in
the state courts of appeal because the supreme court has not ruled on the issue.
No action on the covenant in a purely at will relationship has been allowed,
for the appellate courts have deferred to the state supreme court or, preferably,
to the legislature. 2  The appellate courts understand both management's
and workers' sides of the debate."' Where a manual creates an enforceable
contract, "[t]his contract, as all contracts, impliedly provides for good faith
and fair dealing between the parties. All parties are bound by law to 'act in
word and deed, in a responsible manner' and the triers of fact in assessing
damages would hold the parties to this standard.,
254
Texas
The court of appeals has had the final word to date and has refused to
create a covenant without the approval from the higher court or the legisla-
ture. 55
249. Peterson v. Glory House, 443 N.W.2d 653, 655,4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 912,
112 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,078 (S.D. 1989); Breen v. Dakota Gear & Joint Co., 433 N.W.2d 221,
224, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 92 (S.D. 1988).
250. For a discussion of Morriss, see supra text accompanying notes 114-17.
251. Breen, 433 N.W.2d at 224. The dissent took the position that there would be no need
to transplant, that the legislature had planted the seed by adopting the Uniform Commercial Code
and its obligations of good faith. Id. at 224-25 (Sabers, J., dissenting). Judge Sabers has quite
a line of dissent in this area, all in favor of imposing a meaningful covenant. See Peterson, 443
N.W.2d at 656; Butterfield v. Citibank of S.D., 437 N.W.2d 857, 860, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas.
(BNA) 304, 113 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,133 (S.D. 1989); Johnson v. Kreiser's, Inc., 433 N.W.2d
225, 228, 3 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1767 (S.D. 1988); French v. Dell Rapids Community
Hosp., 432 N.W.2d 285, 292 (S.D. 1988); Larson v. Kreiser's, Inc., 427 N.W.2d 833, 835 (S.D.
1988); Blote v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Rapid City, 422 N.W.2d 834, 838, 4 Ind. Emp.
Rights Cas. (BNA) 311 (S.D. 1988).
252. Randolph v. Dominion Bank, 826 S.W.2d 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); Whittaker v.
Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4599 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
253. Compare Whittaker, 621 S.W.2d 395 with Watson v. Cleveland Chair Co., 789 S.W.2d
538, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1779, 118 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,538 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1989).
254. Williams v. Maremont Corp., 776 S.W.2d 78, 109 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,919 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1988).
255. Winograd v. Willis, 789 S.W.2d 307, 310, 116 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,368 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1990). For a discussion of Texans' general hostility to the theory of good faith and fair
dealings as "contrary to the long-established adversary system which has ably served Texas for
over 150 years," see generally Evelyn T. Ailts, A New Tort for Texas: Breach of the Duty of




Evidently, the existence of the covenant in the employment context is
supported by only a minority on the high bench in Utah. In the recent case
of Berube v. Fashion Centre Ltd., 56 a worker was fired when she refused to
take a third polygraph test. A handbook expressly provided that refusal to
take the test was grounds for firing, and the court found an implied-in-fact
contract.
Two judges opined that the covenant is recognized in all contracts,
including employment contracts. 7 Their opinion, which appears first in the
official record and is referred to as the "lead opinion," attempted to define
what the covenant requires. "The duty of good faith is 'unconditional and
independent in nature' and requires the parties to deal fairly with each other
and to avoid any act which will injure the right of the other to receive the
benefits of the agreement.""8  These justices included the disclaimer:
"Admittedly, the concept of good faith and fair dealing is not susceptible to
bright-line definitions and tests. It should therefore be used sparingly and
with caution. Where true injustice has occurred, relief should be provided.
Care must be exercised to avoid eclipsing the rule' by expanding the
exception." 9
The concurring opinion, joined by three of the five on the bench,26
charged:
[Tihe lead opinion completely fails to establish predictable guidelines for
determining what that duty is and when an employer can be found to owe
such a duty to an employee. The result would be to give finders of fact a
license to determine the duty's content and to impose their version of the
duty, after the fact, on virtually any employer. I can understand the desire
to assure that justice is done to individual employees, but the cost of
uncertainty for employers is simply too great to justify creation of the cause
of action proposed by the lead opinion.
The concurring justices would nevertheless have sent the matter to the
jury on the implied-in-fact contract claims. They were willing to infer a
"reasonableness" qualifier into the contract:
256. 771 P.2d 1033, 1042-43, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 353, 111 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
56,061 (Utah 1989). See also Justin Olsen, The Course of the Employment At.Will Doctrine
in Utah: Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.-A Turning of the Tide, 5 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 249
(1991).
257. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1046.
258. Id. at 1047 (citing Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728, 1 Ind.
Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 122, 110 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,998, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3030 (Ct.
App. 1980)).
259. Id.
260. Despite the numerical imbalance, the concurrence referred to the two-person opinion
as the "lead opinion."
261. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1051-52 (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
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Fashion Centre would not discharge Berube for a refusal to take a
polygraph examination unless that refusal was unreasonable. And,
construing the facts in the light most favorable to Berube, ajury could also
find that Fashion Centre breached this implied term by requiring Berube to
take a third lie detector test when there were no unexplained indications of
false testimony in the first two tests regarding the same shortages.262
The debate on the court may appear to turn on semantics, but the word
choice may bespeak more substantive differences. The concurrence prefers the
more objective "reasonableness" standard, while the lead opinion is comfort-
able with the arguably more subjective "good faith" language. Neither
standard provides much practical guidance to a jury.
Subsequent Utah decisions have indicated that a cause of action for
violation of the covenant is not recognized.263
Vermont
While Vermont recognizes causes of action arising out of terminations in
violation of public policy, it has refused to expand this category to include
firings motivated by bad faith, malice or retaliation.2 4
Virginia
No reported cases consider the availability of a covenant action in the
employment context. The supreme court has found error in instructing a jury
to award punitive damages to a former employee upon a finding of "malicious
motives.'V6s
Washington
In Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 26 the Washington Supreme Court
refused to adopt the bad faith exception to at will, stating that such an
exception would not strike a proper balance between the employer's interest
in running its business and the employee's interest in maintaining employ-
ment.267 The Washington court also echoed Hawaiian courts' concern268
262. Id. at 1052-53 (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
263. Loose v. Nature-All Corp., 785 P.2d 1096, 1097-98, 4 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA)
1882, 116 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,390 (Utah 1989). Oddly, this opinion was written by Justice
Durham, who also wrote the "lead opinion" in Berube. See also Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812
P.2d 49, 55, 6 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 881, 122 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,939 (Utah 1991)
("in the absence of express terms limiting the right of an employer to discharge for any or no
reason and in the absence of provisions establishing procedures by which a discharge should be
effectuated, it would be inconsistent to hold that an employer, on the basis of the implied
covenant of good faith, is bound to a substantive limitation on the employer's right to
discharge.") (citing Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 91, 98 Lab. Cas.
55,407, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4953 (N.Y. 1983)).
264. Jones v. Keogh, 409 A.2d 581, 582, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4193 (Vt. 1979).
265. Kamlar Corp. v. Haley, 299 S.E.2d 514, 518 (Va. 1983).
266. 685 P.2d 1081, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 392, 105 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,616,
116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3142 (Wash. 1984).
267. Id. at 1086.
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over subjecting "each discharge to judicial incursions into the amorphous
concept of bad faith." '269
The Washington court has stuck fast to Thompson, even refusing to allow
recovery of sales commissions denied in allegedly bad faith.' The court
was swayed by the existence of a contractual clause setting out how the
commissions would be paid in the case of termination. This demonstrated that
the parties had considered termination and had declined to disturb the at will
presumption. The court was apparently hesitant to impose any good faith
obligation. "Whether it would be applicable in cases of egregious employer
abuse where discharge was for the purpose of defeating accrued commissions
and the contract is silent on compensation is not before us."27' The Washing-
ton court, like the New York court in Murphy,2 72 was troubled that implica-
tion of the covenant would be inconsistent with other existing contract
terms.
273
On the other hand, the Washington court did not hesitate to employ a
good faith standard when interpreting existing contractual terms. 274 Where
an implied-in-fact contract was created by a manual which provided that an
employer could discharge only for just cause, the jury should have been
instructed:
"[J]ust cause" is a fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith
on the part of the party exercising the power.... [A] discharge for "just
cause" is one based on facts (1) supported by substantial evidence, (2)
reasonably believed by the employer to be true and (3) which are not for
any arbitrary, capricious, or illegal reason.275
West Virginia
Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmon276 established that in West
Virginia the only limitation of the employer's "absolute right to discharge an
employee at will" is the public policy principle. 7
268. For a discussion of Hawaii's approach in Parnar v. Americana Hotel, Inc., see supra
text accompanying notes 95-97.
269. Thompson, 685 P.2d at 1086 (quoting Pamar v. Americana Hotel, Inc., 652 P.2d 625,
629 (Haw. 1982)).
270. Willis v. Champlain Cable Corp., 748 P.2d 621, 625, 3 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA)
187 (Wash. 1988) (certified question from the Ninth Circuit).
271. Id.
272. For discussion of New York's Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., see supra
text accompanying notes 215-20.
273. Willis, 748 P.2d at 626.
274. Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., Inc., 769 P.2d 298, 303, 4 Ind. Emp.
Rights Cas. (BNA) 208 (Wash. 1989).
275. Id. at 304.
276. 246 S.E.2d 270, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4380 (V. Va. 1978).
277. Id. at 275. See also Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co., 285 S.E.2d 679, 680 (V. Va. 1981).
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Wisconsin
In Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,"8 Wisconsin declined to read the
covenant into an otherwise at will employment contract, citing Hawaii's
Parnar79 The court expressed its desire to keep narrow the exceptions to
at will, otherwise
the next complaint would be based on the employer's failure to exercise due
process in the discharge or failure to grant equal rights to the employee in
the discharge. That Pandora's box would have no limits to claims not
susceptible to a motion for summary judgment and would eliminate any
distinction between private and governmental employment.
280
Wisconsin courts have since rejected attempts to make exceptions to
Brockmeyer, reaffirming that no action on the covenant will sound in either
at will or "definite" employment relationships28' again because of dislike of
the amorphous standard, fear of restricting employers' managerial discretion,
and rejection of the idea that an employment relationship involves a fiduciary
duty which warrants a duty of good faith.282
Wisconsin law leaves room for the covenant to be implied-in-fact like
any contract term. "In such a case the court would not be imposing a duty on
the employer to terminate in good faith. Rather, the employer would be
imposing that duty on itself."2  Certainly, bad faith breach of an express
term is actionable.2 4
Wyoming
In Ha'feld v. Rochelle Coal Co.,285 the Wyoming Supreme Court
reaffirmed the general rule that no covenant is imposed into an at will
relationship 286 although it left open the possibility of imposing the covenant
in the "right" at will situation. V Wyoming takes the interesting position
278. 335 N.W.2d 834, 98 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,398, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4484 (Wis.
1983).
279. For a discussion of Parnar, see supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
280. Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 396 N.W.2d 167, 172, 105 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,621
(Wis. 1986).
281. Hale v. Stoughton Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 89, 93, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas.
(BNA) 1774 (Vis. Ct. App. 1985).
282. Id.
283. Funk v. Sara Lee Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1365, 1367,3 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 853
(E.D. Wis. 1988).
284. Dvorak v. Pluswood Wis., Inc., 358 N.W.2d 544, 595, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2043
(Wis. Ct. App. 1984). Obviously this action would sound in contract with no punitive damages
available. Id. at 546.
285. 813 P.2d 1308,6 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1057, 122 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 56,962
(Wyo. 1991).
286. Id. at 1309. See also Ware v. Converse County Sch. Dist. No. 2, 789 P.2d 872, 874-
75, 5 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 399 (Wyo. 1990).
287. Hatfield, 813 P.2d at 1309.
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that the covenant will not apply if the situation is not at will.288 Apparently,
the conception of the covenant here is as a gap filler. If any enforceable
contract terms apply, they will be enforced without reference to the cove-
nant.
289
288. Id. See also Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1064, 1 Ind. Emp,
Rights Cas. (BNA) 864, 105 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 55,648 (Vyo. 1986); Mobil Coal Producing,
Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 704, 709-10, 1 Ind. Emp. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1341, 103 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) 55,520 (Wyo. 1985) (Rose, J., concurring specially).
289. Hatfield, 813 P.2d at 1309.
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